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ABSTRACT
Although Congress stated in its first statutory finding that it
intended the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to protect at least
43 million Americans from disability discrimination, the Supreme
Court has interpreted this statute so that it covers no more than 13.5
million Americans. More importantly, this Article demonstrates
through the use of Census Bureau data that the ADA's employment
discrimination provisions have been eviscerated to the point that the
ADA protects virtually no Americans who are both disabled and able
to work.
This Article places that problem in the larger context of the Court
undermining Congress's efforts to protect discrete and insular
minorities from employment discrimination. Although Congress has
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sometimes responded to that hostility by enacting "restoration
legislation," this Article argues that such restoration efforts should
be unnecessary. The Court should correct its errors and engage in a
respectful relationship with Congress so that Congress can move on
to new items on its legislative agenda rather than revisit prior items.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the
scope of protection1 provided under federal civil rights law while
also increasingly disavowing the usefulness of legislative history to
interpret these statutes.2 Left only with the legislative text, the
Court has imposed an interpretation on these statutes that can only
be described as "dissing Congress,"3 because it flouts both the
statutory language and congressional intent as reflected in the
legislative history. Hence, the civil rights community has had to
persuade Congress to enact key civil rights legislation twice-first
as a pathbreaking statute, and then again as a "restoration act" 4--
to attain the intended scope of statutory protection. 5
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)6 has been a victim of
this problem. When Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, it adopted
an "anti-subordination" model7 under which it protected a class of
1. Statutes will necessarily contain ambiguities that the courts must resolve. Focusing
on fundamental interpretive issues-such as the scope of coverage, which Congress can be
expected to resolve in its basic design of a statute-this Article argues that the Court has been
consistently disrespectful of Congress's resolution of basic issues in the civil rights context,
requiring Congress to amend the statutes to restore its original intentions. This Article does
not, however, seek to suggest that Congress foresees or resolves all policy matters when
enacting legislation.
2. For an excellent empirical analysis of the Court's declining use of legislative history
in workplace-related statutes, see James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction
and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005).
3. See generally Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV.
80 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court's invalidation of governmental action based on its
own conception of what federal power requires).
4. See infra Part I.
5. Ironically, one of the only exceptions to this pattern of narrow construction of
statutory coverage was forged when the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to cover whites as well as African Americans. See McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-96 (1976). That decision has ultimately narrowed
statutory protection for African Americans by limiting the ability of employers to use race-
conscious methods to redress a prior history of race discrimination. See United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (recognizing the Court's reliance on legislative history
in McDonald).
6. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(2006)).
7. For a discussion of the anti-subordination approach, see Ruth Colker, Anti-
Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007-08
(1986):
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individuals it concluded had faced a history of discrimination.8 The
statute provided that only those who met the definition of "disabil-
ity"9 attained protection, that reasonable accommodations would be
available to such individuals,' and that "reverse" discrimination
lawsuits would not be permitted." This approach stood in contrast
to an anti-differentiation approach, under which anyone in society
would have a cause of action if she demonstrated different treat-
ment on the basis of a physical or mental condition irrespective of
whether that condition fit her within a category of people who had
historically faced discrimination. 2
In addition, Congress carefully structured the ADA around three
titles that would address the major areas in which a history of
Under the anti-subordination perspective, it is inappropriate for certain groups
in society to have subordinated status because of their lack of power in society
as a whole. This approach seeks to eliminate the power disparities between men
and women, and between whites and non-whites, through the development of
laws and policies that directly redress those disparities. From an anti-
subordination perspective, both facially differentiating and facially neutral
policies are invidious only if they perpetuate racial or sexual hierarchy.
Id. (footnote omitted).
8. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA.
L. REV. 397 (2000) (noting the ADA's findings that individuals with disabilities face similar
difficulties in social participation). Congress specified this approach in its seventh
congressional finding by stating that "individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular
minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our
society...." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2006).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006) (defining "disability" as, among other things, "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such individual"). For an excellent discussion of the history of the derivation of the word
"disability" under the ADA, see Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-
Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY
J. EMp. & LAB. L. 91 (2000). Feldblum's article does an outstanding job of describing how
Congress chose a definition of disability under the ADA that it understood was consistent
with the way that term had been used in previous disability civil rights laws. That evidence
is very relevant to Congress's intention in enacting the ADA. This Article focuses more
narrowly on the 43 million figure cited in the ADA's first finding, which the Supreme Court
discussed extensively in Sutton. See infra Part III.A. This particular topic is not discussed by
Feldblum in her article on the legislative history of the term "disability."
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (requiring reasonable accommodations for
qualified individuals with disabilities in the workplace).
11. § 12112(b)(5)(B).
12. See Colker, supra note 7, at 1007 (distinguishingbetween anti-subordination and anti-
differentiation approaches).
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disability discrimination existed: the workplace,13 the public sector,14
and accommodations open to the public. 15 Its statutory findings
paralleled this approach by indicating that a history of discrimina-
tion existed "in such critical areas as employment, housing, [and]
public accommodations."' 6 By listing "employment" first in its
description of "critical areas," and by addressing the problem of
employment discrimination in the first title of the ADA, Congress
clearly marked redressing employment discrimination as one of
its top priorities. Finally, Congress's last finding highlighted the
importance of improving employment opportunities for individuals
with disabilities when it identified the goal of "economic self-
sufficiency" for individuals with disabilities.'7 In drafting the ADA,
Congress could not have been clearer in endorsing an anti-subordi-
nation approach and expressing the conviction that this approach
would help redress the historical problem of employment discrimi-
nation in our society against individuals with disabilities.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has historically been hostile
to an anti-subordination perspective in the employment discrimina-
tion context.'" Although the history underlying the enactment of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 suggests that Congress
intended to adopt an anti-subordination perspective to redress the
historical problem of discrimination against racial minorities, 9 the
Supreme Court has often interpreted this statute under an anti-
differentiation approach by permitting "reverse" discrimination
lawsuits and often prohibiting "affirmative action."2 Similarly, the
13. See ADA Title I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17 (2006).
14. See ADA Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-65 (2006).
15. See ADA Title III, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89 (2006).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2006).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2006).
18. See Colker, supra note 7, at 1014. This argument could also be extended outside the
employment context to the voting and housing contexts, in which the Court arguably has also
not respected Congress's anti-subordination approach, but those examples are beyond the
scope of this Article.
19. Undoubtedly, African Americans led the Civil Rights movement of which the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was a major advancement. Its passage was part of a movement to redress
historical discrimination faced by African Americans. See generally CHARLES WHALEN &
BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CML RIGHTS
ACT (1985) (concluding that the granting of equal rights does not guarantee a better quality
of life and recognizing the Act's focus on African Americans).
20. See, e.g., Firefighters Local v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (permitting white firefighters
[Vol. 49:1
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Court has undermined the ADA's anti-subordination approach by
construing the term "disability" so narrowly that the statute is un-
able to provide meaningful protection to individuals with disabilities
who face employment-related discrimination. Under the guise of
the statutory tool of "plain meaning," the Court has transformed
Congress's first finding-that it intends to cover at least 43 million
Americans21-to mean that Congress intends to cover no more than
43 million Americans. In fact, the approach chosen by the Court
only results in about 13.5 million Americans receiving statutory
coverage, with those individuals typically being so disabled that
they are not qualified to work even with reasonable accommoda-
tions.22 This narrow interpretation, which contradicts the plain
statutory language of the ADA, essentially erases the statute's
employment discrimination provisions.23
to challenge an affirmative action plan that tried to minimize the disproportionate impact of
layoffs on minority firefighters). The Court has also limited the availability of "disparate
impact" lawsuits, which would be an important tool under a group-based anti-subordination
approach. See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657, 659 (1988).
Nonetheless, the Court's hostility to an anti-subordination approach has, in some instances,
been limited. For example, it has permitted a cause of action for sexual harassment in ways
that further an anti-subordination approach. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
64 (1986); see also Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN.
L. REv. 691, 704 (1997).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2006) ('The Congress finds that-(1) some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as
the population as a whole is growing older.").
22. Throughout this Article, I talk about those who are mildly disabled and able to work,
and I contrast them with those who are severely disabled and often unable to work. By
offering this distinction between severe and mild disability, I do not mean to suggest that no
individuals with severe disabilities are able to work. I also do not mean to suggest that a clear
distinction exists between a mild and severe disability; but those are two categories used by
the Census Bureau and are useful for the sake of this discussion. The Census data reveals
that around 13.5 million Americans, at the time the ADA was enacted, reported that they
were both disabled and unable to work. See discussion infra Part II. Another 21 million
Americans reported that they had mild disabilities and were able to work. See id. While
acknowledging that the ADA could be useful to those in the severe disability category, my
primary argument is that the statute has been entirely ineffective in assisting those in the
mild disability category. How the employment discrimination title could be interpreted to
provide better protection for the 13.5 million Americans who report that a disability precludes
them from working is beyond the scope of this Article.
23. This Article emphasizes the importance of the ADA providing workplace protection
for individuals with disabilities under ADA Title I. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17 (2006).
Workplace protection is only one of the three fundamental areas protected by the ADA. Title
II prohibits discrimination by public entities. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-65 (2006). Title III
prohibits discrimination at places of public accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89 (2006).
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When the Supreme Court has resisted an anti-subordination
approach, Congress has often responded by amending the relevant
civil rights statute to restate its anti-subordination perspective.
2 4
Although one might argue that in many instances such give and
take between the judicial and legislative branches is appropriate
due to ambiguous statutory language,25 in this case such an
argument would not apply; the ADA could not be clearer. Its
findings, its overall structure, and its statutory language follow an
anti-subordination approach that is consistent with a "protected
class" model and highlights the importance of redressing a history
of disability-based discrimination in the workplace for this protected
class.
Although a "restoration act" has been introduced in Congress to
correct the Court's interpretation of the term "disability,"26 such
legislative action should be unnecessary. The Supreme Court should
correct the error itself and allow Congress to devote its time to
considering other legislative matters. In fact, the Supreme Court
should apply the "civil rights canon ''27 to interpret the ADA consis-
tently with its remedial anti-subordination perspective, thereby
offering protection for individuals with disabilities who need
workplace protection. In the instances when the Court did interpret
other civil rights statutes consistently with an anti-subordination
approach, the civil rights canon was an important interpretive tool
The Court's narrow interpretation of disability has not had the dramatic effect on Titles II and
III that it has had on Title I because individuals can benefit from Titles II and III even if they
are too disabled to work. Because the scope of Title I is limited to the problem of employment
discrimination, it can only be used by those who are both disabled and seeking employment.
This Article argues that Congress's shrinking of the scope of coverage from 43 to 13.5 million
Americans has rendered Title I ineffective. Whether this shrinkage of coverage has had a
negative effect on Titles II and III is beyond the scope of this Article.
24. See infra Part I.
25. The text of Title VII, for example, does not explicitly follow a "protected class" model
because it creates a cause of action for anyone on the basis of race, gender, national origin or
religion. The Court was therefore faced with the interpretive question of whether Congress
intended to employ a protected class model even though the statutory text does not create that
explicit requirement. The Court ruled that statutory protection was available to whites as
well as racial minorities given this statutory text. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-96 (1976).
26. For example, Representative Sensenbrenner introduced H.R. 6258, entitled the
Americans with Disabilities Act Restoration Act of 2006. H.R. 6258, 109th Cong. (2006).
27. See infra Part I.B.
[Vol. 49:1
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that helped the Court attain that scope of protection.28 In its
proposed revision to the ADA, Congress has stated that the courts
should employ the civil rights canon when interpreting the ADA.29
The civil rights canon should go hand in hand with Congress's
remedial purpose in enacting the ADA.
When Congress decided to adopt a "protected class" anti-subordi-
nation approach under the ADA, it had to make several important,
fundamental decisions: Who did it want to protect under this
protected class model? Did it want to cover only individuals with
severe disabilities who are too disabled to work but who would
benefit from curb cuts and other societal accommodations? Or did it
also want to cover individuals with mild disabilities who, with or
without accommodations, might be able to secure and maintain
employment? Fortunately, the statutory language answered that
question by setting 43 million as the floor rather than as the ceiling,
and by specifying that a basic intention of the statute was to
redress the historical problem of employment discrimination. ° Yet
the Court's interpretation of the ADA has made it an extension
of the Social Security laws for the severely disabled rather than a
workplace protection act for the mildly disabled. As will be dis-
cussed in Part II, the Census Bureau drew a distinction between
those with severe and mild disabilities, as had the Social Security
Administration.3' Aware of that distinction, Congress explicitly
chose to protect both those with mild and severe disabilities. Yet
the Court has interpreted the ADA as if Congress chose only to
protect those with severe disabilities.
Under the ADA, Congress chose a definition of disability similar
to the one used by the Census Bureau,32 which includes individuals
28. See infra Part I.
29. Representative Sensenbrenner's proposed amendment to the ADA includes a "rule of
construction" that states that the "provisions of this Act shall be broadly construed to advance
their remedial purpose." H.R. 6258, 109th Cong. § 6(e) (2006). The Court has refused to adopt
the civil rights canon during a period in which it has become increasingly fond of substantive
canons. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 2.
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2006).
31. See supra note 22 (discussing the severe versus mild disability distinction).
32. The name of the Census Bureau changed in 1986 to the "Bureau of the Census," and
then in 2006 to the "U.S. Census Bureau." To avoid confusion, the bureau will be referred to
as the "Census Bureau" throughout this Article's text.
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with both mild and severe disabilities," to arrive at the 43 million
figure.3 4 The Census Bureau estimated in 2002 that more than 51
million Americans have mild disabilities that impose functional
limitations on their lives.35 Today, one would thus expect the ADA's
definition of disability to cover at least 50 million Americans,
including the nearly 30 million who the Census Bureau found are
mildly disabled and able to work. Although Congress justified its
enactment of the ADA with the hope that the statute would improve
the employment opportunities of individuals with disabilities,36 the
data suggest that the ADA has had no positive effect on those
opportunities.37 This result is not surprising because the Court has
largely limited the coverage of the statute to the approximately 13.5
million Americans who are so "severely disabled" that both the
Social Security Administration and Census Bureau categorize them
as generally unable to work. 8
The Supreme Court's decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines39 has
been the major vehicle to undermine Congress's intentions to cover
those with mild disabilities who are qualified to work. In a case
involving individuals with a correctable visual impairment who
33. See, e.g., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DISABILITY, FUNCTIONAL
LIMITATION, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 1984/85, at 1-2 (1986), available at
http://www.sipp.census.gov/sipp/p70-8.pdf [hereinafter CENSUS BUREAU, DISABILITY]
(inquiring whether individuals have difficulty with: seeing words and letters in ordinary
newsprint; hearing what was said in a normal conversation; having his or her speech
understood; walking a quarter of a mile; walking up a flight of stairs without resting; lifting
or carrying something as heavy as a full bag of groceries; moving around inside and outside
the house; and getting into and out of bed).
34. Congress drafted the ADA based on a report from the National Council on Disability.
See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1999). This report, in turn, relied
on Census Bureau data for its estimate of the number of individuals with disabilities. See
NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL
LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES-WITH LEGISLATIVE
RECOMMENDATIONS 2-4 (1986), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/
1986/pdf/toward.pdf. See discussion infra Part II.
35. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2002
HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/
p70-107.pdf [hereinafter CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 STUDIES].
36. Employment is the first area of discrimination that Congress lists in its findings. 42
U.S.C. § 12 101(a)(3) (2006).
37. See infra notes 123-24.
38. The other reasons why the ADA has not had a positive effect on the employment
opportunities of individuals with disabilities are beyond the scope of this Article.
39. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
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brought suit under the ADA's "actually disabled" theory of disabil-
ity,40 the Court focused on the fact that coverage of all individuals
with a correctable visual impairment could result in 100 million
Americans being covered by the ADA.4' Rather than interpret the
term "disability" in a manner that would not cover everyone with a
correctable visual impairment, through what this Article will term
a "statistical significance approach," the Court constructed an
exceedingly narrow definition of disability that only covered the
approximately 13.5 million Americans who are typically too disabled
to work.42
The Court's narrow interpretation of the "actually disabled" the-
ory of disability might not be problematic if the Court interpreted
the other two theories of disability-the "record of'43 or "regarded
as"44 theories-more broadly. But the Sutton Court also interpreted
the "regarded as" theory so narrowly that it could not be effective for
individuals with mild impairments who face discrimination when
an employer exaggerates the consequences of their impairments.45
40. The ADA provides three potential theories of "disability." An individual can have a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits the performance of major life
activities ("actually disabled"), have a "record of' disability, or be "regarded as" disabled. 42
U.S.C. § 12102 (2) (2006).
41. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487.
42. See infra Part III.A.
43. The term "disability" can mean having a "record of such an impairment." This Article
will not discuss interpretation of subsection 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2006), in part, because
it has received little attention from the courts. Others might consider whether broader
interpretation of subsection (B) could also help solve the 43 million undercounting problem.
For some discussion of narrow interpretations of subsection (B), see infra note 263.
44. The term "disability" can mean being "regarded as having such an impairment." 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2006).
45. Part IV of this Article documents the difficulties that plaintiffs have had using
subsection (C) in employment discrimination cases brought under ADA Title I. By contrast,
narrow interpretation of the "regarded as" prong has had little effect on cases brought under
ADA Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-65 (prohibiting discrimination by state or local government
and, in particular, creating extensive rules with regard to the accessibility of public
transportation) or ADA Title III, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89 (prohibiting discrimination by various
private entities such as hotels, restaurants, places of entertainment, private schools,
professional offices, and stores).
Plaintiffs rarely use the "regarded as" theory outside of the Title I context. I have only been
able to find three appellate decisions since Sutton was decided in 1999 in which the plaintiffs
used the "regarded as" theory outside of the ADA Title I context: Marlon v. W New England
Coll., 124 Fed. Appx. 15 (1st Cir. 2005) (former law student failed to establish that she met
the "regarded as" definition of disability in case challenging university's alleged failure to
provide reasonable accommodations); MX Group, Inc. v. Covington, 293 F.3d 326 (6th Cir.
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Due to the odd "class of jobs" rule46 imposed in these cases, plaintiffs
have to introduce evidence of the defendant's attitude about their
ability to perform other jobs-beyond the specific one for which they
applied. Not surprisingly, such evidence is virtually never available
and results in courts concluding that defendants do not regard
plaintiffs as disabled. Although prior commentators have focused on
the problems with the narrow definition crafted in Sutton under the
"actually disabled" theory,47 the Court's discussion of the "regarded
2002) (former drug addicts found to meet the "regarded as" definition of disability under ADA
Title II for the purpose of challenging the denial of a zoning permit to a methadone clinic
based on a fear that they would cause harm to the community); Betts v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 18 Fed. Appx. 114 (4th Cir. 2001) (university found to have "regarded" student
as disabled when it allowed him a double-time accommodation for his exams).
Plaintiffs rarely lose Title II or III cases on the grounds that they are insufficiently disabled
to attain statutory coverage. If one cannot access public transportation or cannot enter a hotel
or restaurant due to a disability, one is typically "actually" disabled under subsection (A) of
the ADA and does not seek to use subsection (C)'s "regarded as" definition of disability. In
contrast with the numerous unsuccessful ADA Title I cases heard by the Supreme Court,
several cases brought under ADA Titles II and III have been successful. Any problems in
these cases have not been related to the definition of disability. See, e.g., United States v.
Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006) (applying ADA Title II to a case involving a paraplegic inmate
in the state prison system); Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005)
(applying ADA Title III to foreign-flag cruise ships in U.S. waters); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,
532 U.S. 661 (2001) (applying ADA Title III to a case involving the availability of a golf cart
to a professional golfer with a degenerative circulatory disorder); Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S.
581 (1999) (applying ADA Title II to cases involving medical treatment of individuals with
mental disabilities); see generally Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807 (2005) (documenting the comparative
success of cases brought under ADA Titles II and III).
46. See infra Part IV.A.
47. The critiques of Sutton are legion. See, e.g., Melissa Cole, The Mitigation Expectation
and the Sutton Court's Closeting of Disability, 43 How. L.J. 499 (2000); Arlene B. Mayerson
& Kristan S. Mayer, Defining Disabilities in the Aftermath of Sutton: Where Do We Go From
Here?, 27 HuM. RTS. 13 (2000); Kevin L. Cope, Comment, Sutton Misconstrued: Why the ADA
Should Now Permit Employers To Make Their Employees Disabled, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1753
(2004); Robin L. Henderson, Comment, Civil Rights: The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Turning a Blind Eye Towards Legislative Intent, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 52 FLA. L.
REV. 849 (2000); Molly M. Joyce, Note, Has the Americans with Disabilities Act Fallen on Deaf
Ears? A Post-Sutton Analysis of Mitigating Measures in the Seventh Circuit, 77 CHi.-KENT L.
REV. 1389 (2002); Rateb (Ron) M. Khasawneh, Note, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.: Limiting
the Protections Available to Disabled Individuals Under the ADA, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 761
(2002); Julie McDonnell, Note, Sutton v. United Airlines: Unfairly Narrowing the Scope of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 471 (2000); Mary Nebgen, Casenote,
Narrowing the Class of Individuals with Disabilities: Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 31
McGEORGE L. REV. 1129 (2000); Ashley L. Pack, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act
After Sutton v. United Air Lines-Can It Live Up to Its Promise of Freedom for Disabled
Americans?, 89 KY. L.J. 539 (2001); Christopher M. Sacco, Comment, Civil Rights: Narrowing
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as" disabled standard has been largely ignored and is equally
problematic.
Broader interpretation of the "regarded as" theory gives the
courts an excellent opportunity to provide greater protection to
those with mild disabilities who are capable of gainful employment
without imposing costs on employers. "Regarded as" plaintiffs do
not typically seek reasonable accommodations, as they are often
victims of stereotypical thinking. Although they may have genuine
physical or mental impairments, the only limitations imposed by
those impairments may be the product of the attitudes of others. By
narrowly interpreting the "regarded as" theory, the courts have
precluded the ADA from having a positive impact on individuals
with impairments who may be the most capable of working.
Congress stated in its statutory findings that individuals with
disabilities often face discrimination due to "stereotypic assump-
tions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals
to participate in, and contribute to, society."4 Narrow interpretation
of the "regarded as" theory has precluded the ADA from redressing
such stereotypical assumptions in the workplace.
The Supreme Court has therefore failed to interpret the ADA
to fulfill Congress's fundamental purpose of improving employ-
ment opportunities for individuals with disabilities. Coverage of
a minimum of 43 million Americans, rather than 13.5 million
Americans, is necessary to achieve that purpose. Part I of this
Article will trace Congress's repeated enactments of "restoration"
statutes following Supreme Court resistance to congressional
legislation having an anti-subordination perspective. It will argue
that such interaction is disrespectful of Congress's role in society
and creates hurdles for groups that have been historically power-
less and need to seek legislative redress. Individuals with disabili-
ties should not need to lobby Congress twice to attain effective
legislation. Part II will trace the use of the term "disability" under
the ADA. It will show how Congress deliberately chose a broader
meaning for that term than had previously existed under other
federal laws when it enacted the ADA to protect at least 43 million
the Scope of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 52 FLA. L.
REV. 839 (2000).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2006).
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Americans, in order to protect those with mild disabilities who could
obtain employment with greater statutory protection. Part III will
examine the leading Supreme Court cases interpreting the "actually
disabled" theory of disability and argue that these decisions leave
fewer than 13.5 million Americans protected by the ADA-most of
whom are unlikely to be able to take advantage of the statute's
employment protections. Part IV will argue that the "regarded as"
theory could protect those with mild disabilities who face discrimi-
nation when employers exaggerate the consequences of their
impairment, but that an inappropriate "class of jobs" rule precludes
that result. Part V will conclude that the courts should construe the
ADA broadly, consistently with the civil rights canon and con-
sistently with Congress's original intent in enacting the ADA.
I. ONCE SHOULD BE ENOUGH
A. Congress's Reconstruction Efforts
The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted various civil
rights laws so narrowly that they cannot provide meaningful pro-
tection under an anti-subordination perspective. Although Congress
rarely amends statutes to overturn statutory interpretations, 49 it
49. Several studies have confirmed that Congress rarely overrides Supreme Court
statutory interpretations of legislation. See, e.g., Beth Henschen, Statutory Interpretations of
the Supreme Court: Congressional Response, 11 AM. POL. Q. 441, 443-45 (1983) (examining
labor and antitrust cases between 1950-72); Beth M. Henschen & Edward I. Sidlow, The
Supreme Court and the Congressional Agenda-Setting Process, 5 J.L. & POL. 685 (1989)
(examining cases between 1950-72); Thomas R. Marshall, Policymaking and the Modern
Court: When Do Supreme Court Rulings Prevail?, 42 W. POL. Q. 493 (1989); Harvey P. Stumpf,
Congressional Response to Supreme Court Rulings: The Interaction of Law and Politics, 14 J.
PUB. L. 377 (1965); Note, Congressional Reversal of Supreme Court Decisions: 1945-57, 71
HARv. L. REV. 1324 (1958); Note, The Continuing Colloquy: Congress and the Finality of the
Supreme Court, 8 J.L. & POL. 143 (1992). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (examining cases
decided between 1967-90 and concluding that 121 Supreme Court statutory decisions were
overridden in the twelve Congresses under investigation). Although Professor Eskridge argues
that he has uncovered a greater reversal rate than is commonly attributed to Congress,
Professors Spiller and Tiller examine the same data and describe this reversal rate as a
"relatively small percentage of all Supreme Court decisions during this period." Pablo T.
Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations To Override: Congressional Reversals of Supreme
Court Decisions, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 503 (1996) (footnote omitted). Professor Eskridge
concludes that overrides of civil rights legislation are more common than that of other subject
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has done so repeatedly in response to these civil rights decisions
to restore some of the anti-subordination aspects of these statutes
to provide meaningful protection to groups that have faced historical
discrimination. Narrow interpretation of the ADA, which will be
discussed in Parts III and IV, has undermined Congress's ability to
achieve its core purpose-providing effective workplace protection
for individuals with disabilities by protecting those with both mild
and severe disabilities.
The Supreme Court's repeated insistence on interpreting the
scope of civil rights laws narrowly began in 1976, when it concluded
that the prohibition against "sex discrimination" found in Title VII
did not include a prohibition against pregnancy-based discrimina-
tion in General Electric v. Gilbert.50 Because pregnancy-based
discrimination lies at the core of impediments that women have
faced in the workplace, this decision erased the "guts" of Title VII's
protection with respect to women. Congress effectively reversed the
Gilbert decision in 1977 by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA), which defined "because of sex" to include "because of
or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical con-
ditions."51 The PDA was enacted by an overwhelming vote of
Congress within two years of the Gilbert decision and reflected
Congress's understanding that pregnancy-based protection was
necessary to help women achieve equality at the workplace.52
The civil rights community was able to influence Congress to
amend Title VII quickly to reverse Gilbert because of the devastat-
ing impact it had on the effectiveness of Title VII's workplace
protections for women. The PDA was narrow, however, as it did not
areas. Eskridge, supra at 344-45. The numbers within each category, however, are small,
ranging from one to eighteen. He does not state whether those differences are statistically
significant. Further, he also notes that the civil rights category was the leading override area
for the period 1967-92 when data was collected. Id. at 345 n.31. Whether the 121 figure is high
or low may therefore be a matter of dispute, but everyone seems to agree that the Court
overrode an usual amount of civil rights legislation during that time period.
50. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
51. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
52. The Senate vote was 75 to 11. The House vote was 376 to 43. The issue that stalled
passage of the bill was abortion. After passing different versions of the bill, conferees devised
compromise language that passed the Senate by voice vote on October 13 and the House on
October 15. 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 597-98 (1978). Under this compromise language, the bill
did not apply to coverage of elective abortions in health insurance plans. Id. at 597.
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seek to resolve the highly controversial issue of paid pregnancy
leave" or coverage of abortion under employer health insurance
plans.54 The feminist community argued that the Gilbert decision
had "a vast potential of having it applied to any employer rule that
has to do with child bearing."55 Although the feminist community
could not bring about the reversal of other, more controversial anti-
feminist decisions,56 the Gilbert decision was nearly universally
condemned as potentially harming the employment opportunities of
"thousands, perhaps millions of women"57 who were pregnant or
viewed as potentially pregnant.58
53. See, e.g., Maria O'Brien Hylton, "Parental" Leaves and Poor Women: Paying the Price
for Time Off, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 475, 493 (1991) (arguing that the "cost of providing some
employees with parental leave will be borne by low-skill female employees who lose their jobs
or fail to obtain employment because of the increased wage bill faced by the employer");
Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 379 (1985) (arguing for gender-
neutral parenting leave).
54. The PDA states: "This subsection shall not require an employer to pay for health
insurance benefits for abortion, except where the life of the mother would be endangered if
the fetus were carried to term, or except where medical complications have arisen from an
abortion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006). Many women's groups expressed "outrage" at this
language, so the PDA cannot be viewed as a perfect victory for the feminist movement. 34
CONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra note 52, at 599. The PDA simply reversed the more narrow aspect
of the Gilbert holding-coverage of pregnancy-related discrimination outside the abortion
context.
55. Lesley Oelsner, Recent Supreme Court Rulings Have Set Back Women's Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 1977, at 8A.
56. The Supreme Court also ruled that federal Medicaid funds could constitutionally
exclude coverage of abortions. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980). The feminist
community has never succeeded in persuading Congress to reverse that decision by directly
funding abortions for poor women.
57. Oelsner, supra note 55.
58. This was a real, not theoretical, problem that could capture Congress's attention.
Employers still had blanket rules discharging school teachers when they became pregnant,
and health care and disability policies often treated pregnancy differently than all other
conditions. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647-48 (1974) (pregnant
public school teachers successfully challenged mandatory maternity leave laws).
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The most recent example59 of Congress reversing the Supreme
Court arose when it reversed or modified nine Supreme Court cases
decided between 1986 and 1991 with the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.60 The initial impetus behind the bill's passage was the
Wards Cove decision, in which the Court cut back on the availability
of "disparate impact" discrimination-a longstanding basic tool
for enforcing Title VII 61-- consistent with an anti-subordination
principle by allowing class-based suits to go forward. Then, in
response to the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas hearing, Congress
broadened the scope of this proposed amendment to permit limited
money damages for victims of harassment or other intentional
discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, or disability.62 Such
relief was already available on the basis of race under another
statute without any financial limitations.63 This focus on expanding
remedies available for victims of sexual harassment was also
consistent with an anti-subordination approach because it was
responsive to an understanding of one of the major impediments
that precluded equality for women at the workplace.
Congress expressed its frustration with the Court's narrow
interpretations of the Civil Rights Acts by proposing a "rule of
59. There are many other examples of congressional reversal of decisions by the Supreme
Court that undermined the basic effectiveness of civil rights statutes. See, e.g., Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (overturning the narrow
interpretation of the ADEA); Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102
Stat. 28 (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2006)) (overturning the narrow interpretation
of the phrase "program or activity" in various federal civil rights statutes). Professor Brudney
has extensively discussed this congressional override. See James J. Brudney, Congressional
Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1, 11-20 (1994) (discussing the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act); 44 CONG.
Q. ALMANAC 63 (1988) (discussing the Civil Rights Restoration Act and Congress's override
of President Reagan's veto).
60. See generally 47 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 251-61 (1991). The overturned or revised decisions
include Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989); Patterson
v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S.
900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T.
Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986); Evans
v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
61. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 662 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2006) (authorizing limited compensatory and punitive
damages under Title VII).
63. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (describing remedies
under § 1981).
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construction" in the 1991 Act, 4 which applied to disability nondis-
crimination laws as well as those laws that applied to race, color,
nationality, origin, sex, religion, and age.65 The proposed rule stated
that "[a]ll federal laws protecting the civil rights of persons shall be
interpreted consistent with the intent of such laws, and shall be
broadly construed to effectuate the purpose of such laws to provide
equal opportunity and provide effective remedies."66 This language
was adopted by the House but, without any explanation in the
legislative history, was not in the final version adopted by the
Senate. Had the Court followed the civil rights canon on its own
volition, Congress would not currently be in the position of having
to restore the ADA to its original intentions.
The year 1991 marked the last time Congress was able to forge a
coalition to "restore" an anti-subordination interpretation of civil
rights legislation. Although the lower courts began to interpret the
ADA broadly, and occasionally invoked the civil rights canon,67 the
Supreme Court did not endorse a broad reading of the statute.
While rendering lip service to Congress's first finding that it
intended to cover at least 43 million Americans with disabilities, the
Court's narrow readings of the ADA have led to no more than 13.5
million Americans being covered by the statute and rendered the
employment discrimination aspects of the statute ineffective.6 "
One could respond to this series of events by remarking that the
Court can legitimately interpret civil rights legislation narrowly
because Congress has the final word, and thus can reverse the
Supreme Court. Civil rights coalitions, however, are notoriously
treacherous to organize, and the civil rights community should not
have to expend its political capital on dictating the basic scope of
legislation twice through the use of both the enactment and
amendment processes.69 The civil rights community was only able
64. Congress also took the highly unusual step of defining, by statute, the parts of the
legislative history that were relevant to its interpretation. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, §§ 3(2), 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991).
65. H.R. 1, 102d Cong. (1991) (proposed § 1107(c)).
66. H.R. 1, 102d Cong. (1991) (proposed § 1107(a)).
67. See infra Part II.
68. See infra Parts III and IV.
69. See generally RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING
FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY (1984) (discussing the difficulty of enacting legislation on behalf
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to persuade Congress to reverse Gilbert because the notion that
sex discrimination did not inherently include pregnancy-based
discrimination was considered outrageous. The 1991 Civil Rights
Act would probably not have been enacted but for the unusual point
in time during which both a Supreme Court nominee was accused
of sexual harassment and an avowed racist was nominated for
Governor of Louisiana.7 ° Such unusual moments should not be nec-
essary for the courts to honor Congress's basic policy preferences
about an anti-subordination perspective.
Further, it is inappropriate that civil rights legislation-but not
other legislation-has to continually resist efforts to limit its scope
of coverage. Although Congress has attempted "restoration efforts"
in response to other Supreme Court decisions, these other restora-
tion efforts have not involved restoring basic policy matters that
Congress clearly resolved at the time of enactment.7' In fact, some
conclude that many other overrides were actually foreseen and
addressed by the Court in response to ambiguous legislative text,
resulting in the Court inviting Congress to amend statutes to attain
of individuals with disabilities); WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 19 (chronicling the difficulty
of enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the book's title reflects that the Civil Rights Act was
passed after a year-long debate culminating in a very close vote and the longest filibuster in
Senate history). The connection between enfranchisement and the passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act is clear: When African Americans were disenfranchised in the South, civil rights
legislation had no chance of passage in Congress. For an excellent discussion of the
relationship between enfranchisement of African Americans and the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, see Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure These Rights: Congress, Courts and the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945, 959-61 (2005). See also MARY JOHNSON, MAKE
THEM Go AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER REEVE & THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY
RIGHTS (2003) (chronicling the difficulty of enacting disability rights legislation); JOSEPH P.
SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
(1993).
70. Nicole L. Gueron, Note, An Idea Whose Time'Has Come: A Comparative Procedural
History of the Civil Rights Acts of 1960, 1964, and 1991, 104 YALE L.J. 1201, 1210 (1995) ("On
October 22, [1991,] one week after the Senate voted to confirm [Clarence] Thomas, and four
days after former Ku Klux Klan Grand Wizard David Duke was named the Republican
candidate in the Louisiana gubernatorial runoff election, the Senate voted 93 to 4 in favor of
cloture on [the 1991 Civil Rights Act].") (footnotes omitted). For a contrasting discussion of
the legislative history of the 1991 Act, see generally C. Boyden Gray, Disparate Impact:
History and Consequence, 54 LA. L. REV. 1487 (1994); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act
of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of the Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation,
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923 (1993).
71. See generally Eskridge, supra note 49, at app. I (listing each piece of override
legislation from 1967-90).
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more policy clarification.72 Such a role is illegitimate when Congress
has expressed its preference, as it has under the ADA, on the core
statutory issue. With regards to the ADA, Congress has explicitly
stated that the scope of coverage should protect at least 43 million
Americans in order for the ADA to have effective workplace
protection.73 Congress should not have to waste its time with
legislative amendments to repeat this basic mandate.74
B. Resurrection of the Civil Rights Canon
As compared with the Burger Court, the Rehnquist Court
approached the task of statutory interpretation by placing less
reliance on legislative history and increased reliance on other tools
of interpretation such as textual language, textual canons, dictio-
naries, and substantive canons.75 Nonetheless, the Rehnquist Court
did not invoke the civil rights canon. Even if one does not accept the
proposition that the civil rights canon should be invoked to interpret
all civil rights legislation, the courts should apply this canon to the
interpretation of the scope of protection provided by the Americans
with Disabilities Act.76
72. Spiller & Tiller, supra note 49, at 504.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2006).
74. Professor Barnes observes that many of these override efforts left some policy
judgments deliberately ambiguous. See JEB BARNES, OVERRULED?: LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES,
PLURALISM, AND CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS 12-15 (2004). That fact,
however, is not surprising given the difficulty of acquiring a legislative consensus on civil
rights matters. Congress can sometimes agree to overturn judgments at the most
fundamental level of coverage with respect to civil rights statutes but may have trouble
agreeing on more specific details like retroactivity or the meaning of a particular defense.
75. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 2, at 30 tbl.I (documenting less reliance on
legislative history and increased reliance on textual meaning, language canons, dictionaries,
and substantive canons between the Burger and Rehnquist Courts).
76. This Article's conclusion, however, that the Court has interpreted the definition of
disability so narrowly so as not to protect 43 million Americans is not dependent on
acceptance of the civil rights canon. One can also reach this conclusion, as argued infra in
Parts II-IV, through literal interpretation of the statutory text. In a time when politicians shy
away from association with the word 'liberal," it is important to remember that there are
strong justifications for the civil rights canon that support this Article's thesis.
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1. The Rise and the Demise of the Civil Rights Canon
The canon that "civil rights legislation should be liberally
construed" is a product of two other canons. It is a subset of the
canon that "remedial legislation should be liberally construed" or
"remedial legislation should be broadly construed to attain its
beneficial purpose."" It also derives from the constitutional law
canon that civil rights protections should be broadly construed.7"
"Liberal construction" of remedial legislation was a vehicle to
distinguish remedial legislation from judge-made common law rules
that were to be construed more narrowly.79 Over time, however, the
distinction between statutory rules and judge-made rules declined.
Instead, the courts began to inquire simply into whether the rule
was "remedial" and, therefore, should be liberally construed. 0
Civil rights legislation is understood to be a subset of this
remedial legislation." The Supreme Court has cited a version of the
civil rights canon with approval when interpreting the Voting
Rights Act, 2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,3 and the
Equal Pay Act 4 in cases that expanded the scope of protection to
women or racial minorities. Invocation of the civil rights canon went
hand in hand with an anti-subordination interpretation of these
77. For an excellent discussion of the history of the remedial legislation canon, see
generally Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose
Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 199
(1996).
78. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
79. Watson, supra note 77, at 232.
80. Id. at 232.
81. See id. at 238.
82. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991) ("[T]he [Voting Rights] Act should be
interpreted in a manner that provides 'the broadest possible scope' in combating racial
discrimination.") (extending the scope of the Voting Rights Act to judicial elections).
83. Ariz. Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1090 (1983) (noting the importance
of the Court acting consistently with the "broad remedial purpose" of Title VI and Title VII,
and extending the scope of Title VII to cover situations in which women receive lesser
retirement benefits through the use of actuarial tables).
84. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208 (1974) ("The Equal Pay Act is
broadly remedial, and it should be construed and applied so as to fulfill the underlying
purposes which Congress sought to achieve.") (extending the scope of the Equal Pay Act to
provide cause of action to women who were victims of pay differentials in shift wage rates that
could not be justified on sex-neutral terms).
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statutes that sought to enhance protection for groups that histori-
cally faced discrimination in society.
The civil rights canon is also related to the principle that
constitutional rights are to be broadly construed. This predecessor
to the civil rights canon in the statutory context was first articu-
lated in the early 1800s.85 In 1886, in a case involving the scope of
the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures,
Justice Bradley noted that a court should "adher[e] to the rule that
constitutional provisions for the security of person and property
should be liberally construed." 6 He offered no precedent for this
proposition, but justified the principle by arguing that it was
necessary to guard these important rights from diminution. 7
The civil rights canon-whether it be considered a subset of the
remedial purpose canon or an extension of the constitutional law
civil rights canon-began to emerge in the 1960s as statutory civil
rights became more commonplace. While recognizing that not all
courts accept the civil rights canon, Sutherland's treatise on
statutory construction summarizes:
There has now come to be widespread agreement ... that civil
rights acts are remedial and should be liberally construed in
order that their beneficent objectives may be realized to the
fullest extent possible. To this end, courts favor broad and
inclusive application of statutory language by which the
coverage of legislation and initiatives to protect and implement
civil rights is defined.88
85. Petitioners argued for application of the canon as early as 1829. See Satterlee v.
Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 406 (1829) (holding that constitutional provisions "were
intended, together, effectually to secure the political and civil rights of the citizen, and to
protect from legislative encroachment. They ought always to be liberally construed in favour
of the rights of the citizen.").
86. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
87. Justice Bradley argued:
A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in
substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of
the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should
be obsta principiis.
Id. at 635.
88. 3B NoRMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 155-58 (2003).
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Further, Sutherland's treatise states that the ADA "must be broadly
construed to effectuate its remedial purpose. '8 9
Nonetheless, Sutherland's treatise is not able to cite recent
examples of the Supreme Court following the civil rights canon.90 It
cites the 1968 decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 91 and the
1969 decision in Daniel v. Paul.92 It cites many decisions from state
courts and federal courts of appeals but no recent decisions from the
Supreme Court. As for the specific application to the ADA, the
treatise cites a 1967 Supreme Court decision,93 which pre-dates
enactment of the ADA by 23 years,94 and two lower court cases, only
one of which survived a motion to dismiss.95 The statement about
the ADA being liberally construed comes at the end of a six-page
section on the interpretation of protections on the basis of having a
"handicap."96 That statement did not appear in the twelve-page
section devoted to interpretation of the ADA,97 and the statement is
not substantiated by the cases cited in support of it because the
Supreme Court has never cited the civil rights canon in an ADA
case. The Supreme Court last cited a version of the civil rights
canon in 1991,9" on the eve of its first interpretation of the ADA.
Hence, the civil rights canon has not been a tool that the Court has
used since it began interpreting the ADA. The Court abandoned the
civil rights canon as it retreated from an anti-subordination theory
in interpreting civil rights legislation.
89. Id. at 208.
90. Id. at 158 n.16.
91. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
92. 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
93. 3B SINGER, supra note 88, at 208 n.21.
94. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967). The treatise presumably cited this case
because it has the famous line: "Remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate
its purposes." Id. at 336. This case, however, involved the interpretation of the Securities Act,
not the ADA.
95. Henderson v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2001) (reversing grant of
summary judgment to the defendant in ADA "regarded as" case); Herrera v. CTS Corp., 183
F. Supp. 2d 921, 931 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (district court granting the defendant's motion to
dismiss plaintiffs disability claim).
96. See 3B SINGER, supra note 88, at 203-08.
97. See id. at 120-31.
98. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 380 (1991).
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2. Particular Applicability of the Civil Rights Canon to the ADA
The dire need to resurrect the civil rights canon is evident in
the context of the Supreme Court's interpretations of the ADA and,
in particular, the Court's interpretation of the word "disability."9
When Congress enacted the ADA, it found that "individuals with
disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of polit-
ical powerlessness in our society."100 Hence, the ADA is remedial
legislation designed to correct an identified problem for a subordi-
nated group in society. The problem of employment discrimination
is the first area of discrimination listed by Congress in its findings,
and the employment discrimination title is the first of three major
titles within the statute. Undoubtedly, the ADA is remedial
legislation that meets the core purpose of the civil rights canon by
enhancing protection for a discrete and insular minority. A major
focus of this legislation is creating effective workplace regulations
to benefit individuals with disabilities.
Congress's findings concerning individuals with disabilities being
a discrete and insular minority are consistent with well-established
facts about the political powerlessness of individuals with disabili-
ties. Many individuals with disabilities are disenfranchised, the
group as a whole has a very low voting turnout record, and few
members of Congress self-identify as members of this group." 1
Further, individuals with disabilities have diffuse interests that are
difficult to unite under a common statutory purpose. Hence, political
mobilization is rarely successful, and major civil rights legislation
to protect this group was not enacted until 1990.102 If the civil rights
canon is to be applied to any contemporary group in society, in-
dividuals with disabilities should be first, or at least high on the list.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006) (defining "disability").
100. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2006).
101. For a discussion of the voting problems facing individuals with disabilities, see
generally Michael Waterstone, Constitutional and Statutory Voting Rights for People with
Disabilities, 14 STAN. L. & POLv REV. 353 (2003). As recently as 2000, the General Accounting
Office estimated that 84 percent of polling places had at least one impediment that could
preclude individuals with disabilities from voting. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, VOTERS
WITH DISABILITIES-ACCESS TO POLLING PLACES AND ALTERNATIVE VOTING METHODS 7 (2001).
102. See JOHNSON, supra note 69, at 11; SHAPIRO, supra note 69, at 140.
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Yet the Supreme Court has not cited it once in interpreting the
ADA.
The disability community has faced a continued history of
disenfranchisement. In 1793, Vermont required voters to have
"quiet and peaceable behaviour" and, in 1819, Maine's constitution
excluded "persons under guardianship" from voting.' Delaware
excluded those who were "idiots" or "insane" from voting in 1831.104
Such exclusions continue today:
Only ten states permit citizens to vote irrespective of mental
disability. Twenty-six states proscribe voting by persons labeled
idiotic, insane or non compos mentis .... Twenty-four states and
the District of Columbia disenfranchise persons adjudicated
incompetent or placed under guardianship .... Four states
disqualify from voting persons committed to mental institutions
... but other laws in three of those states provide that commit-
ment alone does not justify disenfranchisement. 10 '
Physical barriers also preclude voting by individuals with
disabilities. A 2001 report by the Government Accounting Office
found that 28 percent of polling places were inaccessible and did not
provide curbside voting in the 2000 presidential election. 6 The
National Organization on Disability reported in 2001 that fewer
than 10 percent of polling places used audio output that would allow
visually impaired voters to vote privately and independently. 0 7
Historically, the courts did not consider these kinds of problems
to be important. When Connecticut required that all voting take
place in person, and that absentee voting not be permitted, Judge
Newman ruled against the plaintiffs with the following language: "A
physically incapacitated voter has no more basis to challenge a
voting requirement of personal appearance than a blind voter can
complain that the ballot is not printed in Braille."'' 0 It was unthink-
103. ME. CONST. of 1819, art. II, § 1.; VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. II, § 21.
104. DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1.
105. Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644, 1645-46 (1979)
(internal footnotes omitted).
106. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 101.
107. NAT'L ORG. ON DISABILITY, ALERT: MOST VOTING SYSTEMS ARE INACCESSIBLE FOR
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (Aug. 2, 2001), http://www.nod.org.
108. Whalen v. Heimann, 373 F. Supp. 353, 357 (D. Conn. 1974) (finding no equal
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able in the 1970s that voters with disabilities should seek equal
access to the polls. Although Congress has since passed some weak
measures designed to improve accessibility to the polls for individu-
als with disabilities,'0 9 their voting participation rates are low and
accessibility is inadequate.'
These barriers to voting made the passage of the ADA a remark-
able event. The forces that combined to make this event occur
are too diverse to summarize in a brief sentence or paragraph.
Presidential politics, Vietnam veterans with disabilities, personal
stories of disability within the families of key point people, and
other factors colluded in the drafting of a disability civil rights
statute that the New York Times described, at the time, as one that
no one could safely oppose.' Those forces, however, have not
converged again since 1990 to persuade Congress to amend the
statute in the face of repeated narrow interpretation of its most
basic elements, ' and those amendments should not be necessary
in the first place.
to vote and stating that it is not "the province of courts to weigh the relative ease or difficulty
with which the state could accommodate its voting procedures to meet the needs of various
handicapped voters"); see also Selph v. Council of L.A., 390 F. Supp. 58, 61-62 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause does not require city to make polling places
accessible to the disabled when absentee voting is available).
109. See, e.g., Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973ee (2006).
110. See Michael E. Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, and Voting, 56 ALA. L. REV.
793, 827 (2005). Waterstone stated:
Social science research demonstrates that the cumulative effect of these
problems is decreased voting levels for people with disabilities. The 2000
National Organization on Disability/Harris Survey found that voter registration
is lower for people with disabilities than for people without disabilities (62
[percent] versus 78 [percent], respectively). A different survey in 1999 found that
people with disabilities were on average about twenty percentage points less
likely than those without disabilities to vote and ten points less likely to be
registered to vote, even after adjusting for differences in demographic
characteristics (age, sex, race, education, and marital status).
Id.
111. See generally RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 22-68, 218 n.60 (2005).
112. It is possible that these forces will converge in 2007 or 2008, due to Democratic control
of Congress and increasing numbers of disabled veterans needing more assistance from the
federal government. Even so, many believe that it would be very unfortunate for these groups
to have to expend their legislative capital on restoring legislation that has previously been
enacted; the public interest would be better served by these groups tackling other issues that
also affect their communities but do not already have an adequate legislative response.
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One might argue that the mere existence of the ADA, and
the willingness of nondisabled individuals to consider legislative
initiatives on behalf of individuals with disabilities, demonstrates
that the civil rights canon is unnecessary in this context. In that
sense, however, individuals with disabilities are no different than
women or racial minorities who benefited from the application of the
civil rights canon in the early interpretations of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. By definition, a group can only seek application of the
civil rights canon if it has succeeded in convincing the legislature
to enact laws on its behalf. The low rates of enfranchisement by
individuals with disabilities coupled with their late entry into the
legislative arena, however, suggest that they are at least as worthy
of application of this canon as any other group that has attained
protection legislation. The disability community only attained its
'Title VII equivalent" in 1990-twenty-six years after such legis-
lation protected women and minorities.'13 Unlike the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, the ADA has not benefited from the Court applying the
civil rights canon in its early years of interpretation. 4 Hence, the
most basic determination under the statute-the definition of
disability-has been construed so narrowly as to undermine the
basic effectiveness of the statute." 5 Although it may not be neces-
sary to apply the civil rights canon to every interpretation of a civil
rights statute, that canon is crucial to the interpretation of a statute
in its early years when fundamental coverage decisions are made
about the scope of a statute's protection. As Parts III and IV will
demonstrate, the failure to apply this canon has led the Court not
even to honor the strict statutory language of the ADA. The Court's
recognition of the legitimacy of the civil rights canon might, at least,
help honor Congress's clearly expressed intentions to provide
meaningful protection to individuals with disabilities at the
workplace, and to protect at least 43 million Americans.
The civil rights canon dictates broad interpretation of remedial
civil rights legislation." 6 But even if one did not articulate a pre-
sumption of broad interpretation, the language of the ADA itself
counsels broader interpretation of the term "disability" than has
113. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
114. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
115. See infra Part III.
116. See supra Part I.B.1.
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been permitted by the Supreme Court. There is no good justification
for interpreting the statute so narrowly that it covers 13.5 rather
than 43 million Americans, and provides no protection to those who
are mildly disabled and able to work.
II. DERIVATION OF THE 43 MILLION FIGURE
When Congress stated in its first finding that it sought to protect
at least 43 million Americans from disability discrimination, it
intended to cover those with mild disabilities, as well as those with
severe disabilities. It sought to protect more than those already
protected under the Social Security laws or labeled as "severely
disabled" by the Census Bureau who were unable to obtain employ-
ment. Otherwise, it would have signaled a more narrow statutory
scope by stating that it intended to cover no more than 13.5 million
Americans.
A. Social Security Laws
The term "disability" is a legally created category to define who
should receive assistance or protection.'17 That term first appeared
in federal law in 1790 to define who should receive compensation for
injuries sustained in war."' The initial use of that term was to
define who had an incapacity that precluded manual labor. 1 9
In 1935, Congress made the historic decision to create a federally-
funded pension system through the Social Security program for
117. Race is also a legally constructed category. See, e.g., RUTH COLKER, HYBRID:
BIsExuALs, MuLTIRAcIAIs, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1996); F. JAMES DAVIS,
WHO IS BLACK?: ONE NATION'S DEFINITION (1991); IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996). But, the ADA is different than Title VII in that one
must meet a definition of "disability" to attain statutory protection. Everyone is considered
to have a "race" for the purposes of Title VII.
118. See 1 Stat. 119, 121 (1790) ('That if any commissioned officer, non-commissioned
officer, private or musician aforesaid, shall be wounded or disabled while in the line of his
duty in public service, he shall be placed on the list of the invalids of the United States, at
such rate of pay, and under such regulations as shall be directed by the President of the
United States, for the time being.").
119. See generally Peter Blanck & Chen Song, "Never Forget What They Did Here" Civil
War Pensions for Gettysburg Union Army Veterans and Disability in Nineteenth-Century
America, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1109, 1120 (2003).
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workers who reached the age of sixty-five.12° At that time, individu-
als could only attain Social Security benefits if they had previously
been in the workplace until age sixty-five. From the outset, some
people suggested that benefits should also be extended to people
who retired early on an involuntary basis due to disability.12" ' In
1954, Congress introduced the concept of "disability" into the Social
Security structure by making benefits available to workers who had
paid into the Social Security system but retired between the ages
of fifty and sixty-five due to disability.'22 It defined disability as
"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or to be of long-continued
and indefinite duration." '23 The concept of work-related disability
expanded from a focus in the nineteenth century on physical
disabilities to a recognition of physical and mental disabilities that
precluded people from working. In 1960, the minimum age require-
ment was eliminated. 24 Congress replaced the requirement that
the disability be of "long-continued and indefinite duration" in 1965
with a requirement that it "be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months. 125 In 1972, the Social Security
program was expanded to include those who were disabled and had
not contributed to the Social Security system through what is
termed the "SSDI" program.1
26
The disability rosters greatly expanded after Congress eliminated
the minimum age requirement, as well as the requirement that the
individual be previously employed, so that, by 1975, the disability
program became larger than the Social Security program for
individuals over the age of sixty-five. This growth continued despite
a narrowing of the definition of disability in 1968 to require that a
claimant:
120. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
121. The original program also created a system of state grants for assistance to visually
impaired individuals or "crippled" children, so some sensitivity to the issue of disability arose
at the beginning of this program although the term "disability" was not broadly used by
Congress at that time. See id.
122. Social Security Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-761, 68 Stat. 1052, 1079 (1954).
123. Id. at 1080 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1)).
124. Pub. L. No. 86-778, 74 Stat. 924, 967 (1960).
125. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, 366 (1965).
126. Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329, 1465 (1972).
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is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, consider-
ing his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immedi-
ate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy
exists for him or whether he would be hired if he applied for
work. 127
The 1968 amendment reflected Congress's interest in reducing
the disability rosters by encouraging individuals with disabilities
to obtain work. Congress attempted further tinkering with the
Social Security disability laws through "Ticket to Work" and other
measures, but the Social Security disability rosters did not dimin-
ish.128 By 1990, when Congress passed the ADA, approximately 5
million Americans were receiving benefits under SSDI.'29 Today,
nearly 9 million Americans receive SSDI benefits.13 °
The ADA was passed, in part, in an attempt to help remove some
individuals from the Social Security rosters by having them enter
the workforce.'31 Unfortunately, those hopes were unrealistic."3 2
Nonetheless, Congress would have understood in 1990 that the 5
million Americans who received disability-related Social Security
benefits were a small minority of the 43 million Americans who it
expected to cover under the ADA. By picking the figure of 43 million
to signal its scope of protection, Congress was signaling that it
127. Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821, 868 (1968) (§ 158 amending § 223(c) of the Social
Security Act).
128. See Paul Armstrong, Toward a Unified and Reciprocal Disability System, 25 J. NAVL
ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 157, 172 (2005).
129. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM, 2004, at 17 tbl.1, available at http://www.SA.gov/policy/
docs/statcomps/diars/2004/di asrO4.pdf (reporting that 4.9 million Americans received
disability benefits in 1990, of whom 3 million qualified for those benefits as "workers").
130. See id. (reporting that 8.8 million Americans received disability benefits in 2004, of
whom 6.2 million qualified for those benefits as "workers").
131. See 135 CONG. REC. S4984 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) ("I
believe that the ADA will substantially reduce the costs of dependency of individuals with
disabilities."); 134 CONG. REC. S5972 (daily ed. May 16, 1988) (statement of Sen. Riegel) ("I
am currently developing legislation which would protect certain benefits for beneficiaries of
the Social Security Disability Insurance Program to facilitate their ability to enter the work
force.").
132. See supra notes 129-30 (reporting Social Security figures for 1990 and 2004).
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intended a much larger group than had been covered under the
Social Security laws.
B. The 43 Million Figure
The available evidence strongly suggests that Congress relied
on estimates from the Census Bureau, not the Social Security
Administration, for its conclusion that the ADA's definition of
disability would protect 43 million Americans.'33 Deriving the 43
million figure, however, requires one first to derive a 36 million
figure because Congress began its discussion of the ADA in 1988
with a bill that defined the number of Americans with disabilities
as 36 million.
1 4
In 1986, the Census Bureau published a report entitled "Disabil-
ity, Functional Limitation, and Health Insurance Coverage:
1984/85.' ' 3 This report was based on a survey of houses during
May-August 1984, in which residents were asked a set of questions
on their disability status.1 36 These questions focused on physical
impairments that might impose functional limitations on individu-
als who were over the age of fifteen.
137
The 36 million figure from the 1988 version of the ADA is
consistent with the Census Bureau report.' 38 The Bureau found that
133. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1999) (concluding that
Congress relied on Census Bureau data for its estimate of who was covered by the ADA).
134. See 134 CONG. REC. S5106 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1988). The 1988 bill was the product of
a report by the National Council on Disability. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484-85. This report,
which was repeatedly cited by Congress, made it clear that the definition of disability was
intended to be broad. See, e.g., NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES-WITH
LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (1986), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/
publications/1986/pdfltoward.pdf. The 1988 bill was consistent with that intention: it pro-
hibited discrimination on the basis of handicap and then defined the term "handicap" broadly
to include any effect on a bodily system. See 134 CONG. REC. S5106 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1988).
It defined the phrase "on the basis of handicap" to mean "because of a physical or mental
impairment, perceived impairment, or record of impairment." Id. The bill then defined
"physical or mental impairment" to mean "any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more systems of the body." Id.
135. See CENSUS BUREAU, DISABILITY, supra note 33.
136. See id. at 1.
137. Id.
138. See supra note 134. The drafters of the ADA were clearly aware of the Census Bureau
Report, and the 1988 version of the ADA was recommended to Congress by the National
Council on Disability, and the National Council on Disability authored a report in support of
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37.3 million persons 13.5 years of age or older had a functional
limitation in one or more of the nine areas that they measured:
seeing, hearing, speech, lifting or carrying, walking, using stairs,
getting around outside, getting around inside, and getting into and
out of bed.'39 Of those 37 million Americans, only 8 million between
the ages of sixteen and sixty-four years said they had a disability
that prevented them from working.140 Thirteen million of the 37
million Americans with disabilities were over the age of sixty-five
and not likely to be working irrespective of their disability status. 141
These figures suggest that Congress, in 1988, would have been
aware that about 24 million of the individuals covered by the ADA
could have been expected to be covered by Title I-the ADA's
employment title-if they faced discrimination in the workplace
because they appeared to be both mildly disabled and qualified to
work.
The estimate that at least 24 million Americans covered by the
ADA would be qualified to work is also consistent with the modest
nature of the functional limitation definition used by the Census
Bureau in its survey. The Census Bureau had both a "functional
limitation" category and a "severe limitation" category. 42 Although
37.3 million Americans were found to have a "functional limitation,"
13.5 million were found to have a "severe limitation.' 43 That 13.5
million figure was consistent with those who reported that they
had a disability that "prevented [them] from working.'1 44 By con-
trast, nearly 24 million Americans reported they had a disability
that did not preclude them from working. 14 In fact, of the 18.2
million between sixteen and sixty-four who reported that they had
the 1988 bill that referred extensively to the Census Bureau data.
139. See CENSUS BUREAU, DISABILITY, supra note 33, at 2 and accompanying tbl.A.
140. See id. at 5.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 2.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 5. Eight million Americans between the ages of sixteen and sixty-four "were
prevented from working by their disability," as were 4 million between the ages of sixty-five
and seventy-two. Id.
145. See id. Of people age sixteen to sixty-four, 18.2 million "had a work disability." Id. The
sixty-five to seventy-two age group contained 5.3 million with "a work disability." Id. A "work
disability" was defined as "a condition that limited the kind or amount of work [a person]
could do." Id.
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a disability that did not preclude them from working, 11.8 million
reported that they were in the labor force. 46
What do those statistics reveal? They suggest that Congress
would have had to use a "mild disability" definition in 1990 rather
than a "severe disability" definition if it sought to protect more than
36 million Americans from disability discrimination. When Congress
revised the ADA during the legislative process to cover 43 million
rather than 36 million Americans, it could not have intended to
protect only those covered by the Social Security Administration
(about 5 million) or only those covered by the Census Bureau's
definition of "severe disability" (13.5 million).'47
Moreover, one should remember that Congress intended the 43
million to be a floor rather than a ceiling. Congress stated, in its
first finding, that the number of Americans with disabilities is
growing as the population ages. 48 The 1997 Census Bureau report,
which relied on similar categories of functional limitations, con-
cluded that 52.6 million individuals had a disability. 49 Unlike the
1984/85 data, this report included 4.6 million Americans who were
under the age of fifteen. 5 ° Nonetheless, it reflects an increase in
the disabled population from 37 million to 48 million in a little
more than a decade.' 5 ' Like the 1984/85 Report, the 1997 report also
reflects that more than 13 million Americans have mild disabili-
ties that frequently do not preclude them from working.5 2 Yet, as
we will see, the Supreme Court's definition of disability rarely
146. See id. at 6 tbl.E.
147. The legislative record does not reveal why the number was raised from 36 to 43
million during the drafting process. The fact that the figure was raised, however, at least
suggests that there was some concern that a 36 million figure would be misconstrued to cover
an insufficient number of individuals with disabilities. The Census Report actually mentioned
a 37.3 million figure rather than a 36 million figure, so there was good reason for the
disability community to be concerned that a 36 million figure was too conservative an
estimate. CENSUS BUREAU, DISABILITY, supra note 33, at 2. From a legislative intent
perspective, the decision to raise the figure from 36 million to 43 million must, at a minimum,
demonstrate an attempt to cover at least as many people who are included in the Census
Bureau definition of mild disability.
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2006).
149. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 STUDIES, supra note 35, at 1.
150. See id. at 9 tbl.1.
151. See id.; see also supra note 134 and accompanying text (in order to compare the
disability population).
152. See CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 STUDIES, supra note 35, at 15. About 8.5 million of these
individuals are classified as having a mild disability.
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appears to cover someone who is both disabled and qualified for
employment.'53
In any event, these statistics only reflect estimates of who might
be covered by the "actually disabled" definition of disability. The
ADA also includes those who have a "record of' disability and those
who are "regarded as" disabled.' Those definitions should ex-
tend coverage to more than 43 million, or even more than the 51.2
million people found to be actually disabled in the latest Census
Bureau report. 5' As will be discussed in Part IV, the "regarded as"
prong potentially covers anyone who is falsely regarded as
having a disability that she does not have, or anyone whose actual
impairment is exaggerated so that it falsely seems disabling.
156
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has interpreted the "regarded as"
prong so narrowly that it does not meaningfully add more people to
the scope of statutory coverage.5 7 Thus, even after one considers
the implications of the "record of"5 " and "regarded as" prongs, the
statute still does not come close to covering 43 million Americans,
and will not provide meaningful protection to those who are mildly
disabled and able to work.
III. SUPREME COURT CASES DEFINING "DISABILITY" UNDER
SUBSECTION (A)
As discussed above, Congress's choice of the 43 million figure
reflected an intention to cover those with both mild and severe
disabilities. Yet, the Court has interpreted the ADA inconsistently
with that intent, resulting in the ADA covering no more than 13.5
million Americans, and only covering those too disabled to work.
The Supreme Court's decisions in three cases decided on June 22,
1989, helped achieve that narrow scope of coverage under the
"actually disabled" prong.
153. See infra Part III.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B), (C) (2006).
155. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 STUDIES, supra note 35, at 70-107.
156. See infra Part IV.
157. See infra Part IV.
158. This Article does not focus on subsection (B) because it has not been the subject of
many reported decisions. It appears, however, that the courts have also construed subsection
(B) narrowly. See infra note 273.
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A. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.
Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton argued that United Airlines
violated the ADA by denying them an opportunity to be hired as
pilots when their uncorrected vision could not meet United's visual
acuity standard of 20/100.159 Their uncorrected vision was 20/200 in
one eye and 20/400 in the other eye.' They argued that their
corrected vision-20/20-rendered them qualified for employment
but that United failed to hire them because of their vision in its
uncorrected state. 6 1
The district court's opinion reflects a common judicial perspective
under the ADA: that the ADA only covers those who are severely
disabled and those who need reasonable accommodations. Judge
Daniel Sparr granted United's motion to dismiss, concluding
that the ADA cannot be interpreted to include individuals with
"slight shortcomings that are both minor and widely shared., 162 He
found that "[m]illions of Americans suffer visual impairments no
less serious than those of the Plaintiffs. Under such an expansive
reading, the term 'disabled' would become a meaningless phrase,
subverting the policies and purposes of the ADA and distorting the
class the ADA was meant to protect."'6 3 He overlooked the fact that
the plaintiffs' uncorrected vision placed them in the bottom 2
percent of the United States population and was neither minor nor
widely shared."6
Judge Sparr also assumed that the statute would only cover those
who are visually impaired and who need reasonable accommoda-
tions. To justify the conclusion that the plaintiffs were not covered
by the statute because their visual impairment was insufficiently
disabling, he quoted a sentence from the ADA's legislative history,
which listed the kinds of accommodations that might be needed by
159. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug.
28, 1996), affd, 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997), aff'd, 527 U.S. 471 (1991).
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. Id. at *5.
163. Id.
164. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 507 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing J. ROBERTS, BINOCULARVISuALACuiTY OFADULTS, UNITED STATES, 1960-62, at 3 (Nat'l
Ctr. for Health Stat., Series 11, No. 30, Dep't of Health and Welfare (1968))).
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some individuals with visual impairments.'65 He did not seem to
understand that the statute also covered individuals with mild
impairments who did not need accommodations but faced discrimi-
nation due to the stereotypical attitudes of others.
The next court to consider Sutton and Hinton's case was the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Like the district court, this court
also assumed that the statute covered only those with severe
disabilities. It affirmed the district court's motion to dismiss.'66
In justifying its decision, the Tenth Circuit cited a Fifth Circuit
case and an unpublished decision from the Southern District of New
York in which plaintiffs with visual impairments were found not to
be handicapped under section 504 or the ADA.'67 The Fifth Circuit
case was Chandler v. City of Dallas.6 ' One of the two plaintiffs
in this case was Adolphus Maddox.'69 He had impaired vision in
his left eye that could not be corrected to better than 20/60, and
he had a horizontal field of vision in that eye that was less than
70 degrees. 7 ° The vision in his right eye, however, was normal. 171
Maddox prevailed at trial, but the Fifth Circuit overturned that
decision on appeal, finding that he was not an individual with a
disability under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 172
The Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Chandler was based on an
unpublished Fifth Circuit opinion, Collier v. City of Dallas, in which
the Fifth Circuit had concluded in 1986 that an individual whose
vision in one of his eyes could only be corrected to 20/200 was not
disabled under section 504.173 Since 20/60 vision is better than
165. Sutton, 1996 WL 588917, at *5 ("For blind and visually-impaired persons, reasonable
accommodations may include adaptive hardware and software for computers, electronics [sic]
visual aids, Braille devices, talking calculators, magnifiers, audio recordings and brailled
material." (alteration in original)).
166. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 895 (10th Cir. 1997).
167. See id. at 901 n.8 (citing Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993); Sweet
v. Elec. Data Sys., Inc., No. 95 Civ. 3987, 1996 WL 204471 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1996)).
168. 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993).
169. See id. at 1388.
170. See id. at 1389.
171. See id. at 1388-89.
172. See id. at 1395-96.
173. See id. at 1390 (citing Collier v. City of Dallas, No. 86-1010 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 1986)
(unpublished)). The Moritz Law Library acquired a copy of the Collier opinion from the Fifth
Circuit archives. It is an unpublished opinion with the following notation:
Local Rule 47.5 provides: 'The publication of opinions that have no precedential
value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles
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20/200 vision, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that Maddox was also not
disabled for the purposes of section 504.174 Reliance on Chandler
which, in turn, relied on Collier was peculiar. There is no arguable
basis for concluding that someone whose vision is only correctable
to 20/200 is not disabled. Such vision constitutes legal blindness
for the purpose of the Social Security laws and meets the Census
Bureau's definition of severe disability.175 The Tenth Circuit's ref-
erence to Chandler reflects that it had no manageable standard for
determining which visually impaired individuals should be covered
by the ADA, because the 20/200 holding from Collier cannot be
correct.
In further support of its reasoning, the Tenth Circuit in Sutton
cited Sweet v. Electronic Data Systems, Inc.,'76 an unpublished
decision of the Southern District of New York.177 This case involved
Bryant Sweet, who, as the result of an accident, had vision that was
correctable to 20/80 in one eye and 20/20 in the other eye. 178 Without
glasses, his vision in the weak eye was 20/200.179 District Court
Judge Michael B. Mukasey granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that Sweet was not an individual with a
disability under the ADA."' Judge Mukasey reached his determina-
tion, in part, on the basis of standards for visual impairment used
by various professional organizations."8 ' He noted that the Social
Security Administration defines blindness as vision worse than
20/200 and defines visual impairment as between 20/40 and 20/200,
and that the World Health Organization defines blindness as vision
worse than 20/400 and defines visual impairment as between 20/60
and 20/400.182 Because the "[p]laintiffs corrected visual acuity of
20/80 in his left eye [was] at the strong end of either scale," and
of law imposes needless expense of the public and burdens on the legal
profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
174. See Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1390.
175. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., IF You ARE BLIND OR HAVE LOW VISION-How WE CAN HELP
2 (2007); see also CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 STUDIES, supra note 35, at 2.
176. No. 95 Civ. 3987, 1996 WL 204471 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1996).
177. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 901-02 n.8 (10th Cir. 1997).
178. See Sweet, 1996 WL 204471 at *1.
179. See id.
180. See id. at *1, *9.
181. See id. at *5.
182. See id.
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because the plaintiff was able to participate in a broad range of
activities without difficulty, the court found that he was not
"substantially impaired" in the major life activity of seeing.' 8 Judge
Mukasey then concluded that "[p]laintiffs restricted reading
capacity does not require a different result."' 4
Judge Mukasey's reasoning, however, was inconsistent with the
definition of disability chosen by Congress. Congress did not limit
the visual impairment category to those who are legally blind." 5 The
evidence that Sweet's uncorrected vision was only 20/80, coupled
with the evidence of his difficulties with reading, would have easily
put him within the category of visual impairment used by the
Census Bureau in its 1984/85 household survey on disability.'8 6
An impairment in reading was a part of the Census Bureau
definition of an individual with a visual impairment."7 The problem
with the reasoning in Sweet, like the problem with the reasoning in
Chandler, is that it precludes coverage for those with less than
"severe" visual impairments. Nothing short of legal blindness in
both eyes would appear to suffice.
The Supreme Court followed the path of the lower courts in
construing the "actually disabled" prong of the ADA to apply to only
a very narrow category of individuals with visual impairments.
Unlike the lower courts, however, the Supreme Court closely
examined the 43 million figure to arrive at its conclusion. 88 It
traced the derivation of the 43 million figure to the reports by the
National Council on Disability and the Census Bureau data.18 9
Based on this data, it concluded that Congress could not have
intended to cover people when the limitations imposed by their
disabilities could be reduced through the use of mitigating mea-
sures.190 It noted, for example, that 100 million Americans use
183. Id. at *5.
184. Id. at *6.
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). The ADA never refers to the concept of "legal
blindness" or "blindness" at all. It merely requires an individual to be substantially limited
in one or more major life activities. Legal blindness, as discussed in the text accompanying
note 175, is a term used by the Social Security Administration.
186. See CENSUS BUREAU, DISABIUTY, supra note 33, at 1. The standard used by the Census
Bureau was "difficulty in seeing words and letters in ordinary newsprint." Id.
187. See id.
188. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1999).
189. See id. at 484-85.
190. See id. at 486-87.
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corrective lenses-a figure that, in itself, exceeds the 43 million
estimate. 191
Although the Court was correct to conclude that Congress did not
intend to cover everyone who uses corrective lenses, the Court was
wrong to conclude that Congress did not intend to cover anyone who
benefited from corrective lenses. The Census Bureau report found
that 12.8 million Americans had visual impairments. 92 Only 1.7
million of the 12.8 million individuals with a visual impairment who
were surveyed by the Census Bureau indicated that they were not
able to see letters or words at all, and were therefore placed in the
"severe limitation" category.'9 3 But Congress used the 12.8 million
figure, rather than the 1.7 million figure, to arrive at its 43 million
estimate. The Census Bureau estimate of 12.8 million Americans
with visual impairments constituted about 5 percent of the popula-
tion at the time of the Census Bureau survey, far short of the 100
million who wear corrective lenses. 94
Rather than broadly ruling that no one who uses mitigating
measures to attain 20/20 vision can be covered by the statute, the
Court had other options available that could have resulted in
covering closer to 43 million Americans. For example, the Court
could have presumptively covered anyone whose vision was "signifi-
cantly" worse than the general population in a statistical sense. The
generally accepted standard for statistical significance is two
standard deviations from the mean, or the bottom 2.5 percent.
95
That approach is currently used to determine which children are
presumptively entitled to services under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act. 6 The statistical significance approach,
in fact, is arguably too narrow because the Census Bureau's 12.8
million figure for visual impairment included about 5percent of the
191. Id. at 487.
192. CENSUS BUREAU, DISABILITY, supra note 33, at 1.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. See generally Joseph L. Gastwirth, Employment Discrimination: A Statistician's Look
at Analysis of Disparate Impact Claims, 11 LAW & INEQ. 151, 165 n.77 (1992) (stating that
"[t]he Supreme Court generally assumes that the line of statistical significance lies at two
standard deviations"); see, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308
n.14, 311 n.17 (1977) (citing Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977)).
196. For example, New York uses this approach under the IDEA. See RUTH COLKER &
ADAM A. MILANI, EVERYDAY LAW FOR INDMDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 42-43 (2006).
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1986 population.197 Nonetheless, application of a statistical sig-
nificance test would clearly cover the plaintiffs in the Sutton case
because their uncorrected vision placed them in the bottom 2
percent of the population.198
Alternatively, the Court could have limited the mitigating mea-
sure rule to cases involving visual impairments due to the easy
availability of corrective lenses. Instead, the Court offered an overly
rigid standard under which few Americans who would be seeking
employment could qualify as individuals with disabilities."9 9 The
rigid mitigating measure rule carved out by the Supreme Court in
Sutton was closer to the definition used under the Social Security
Act for those too disabled to work rather than the one used under
the Census data to form the basis for the 43 million figure.200
One might say that it is not fair to blame the Court for this overly
restrictive approach because the parties only gave it two stark
options: accept the EEOC's broad rule to disregard all mitigating
measures, or impose mitigating measures in all cases.20 1 Arguably,
it is hard to expect the Court to craft a rule, such as the two
standard deviation rule, if that rule is not suggested by a party. But
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion did observe that the plaintiffs
in Sutton had vision that placed them in the bottom 2 percent of the
population.2 2 Thus, the majority was aware that middle grounds
were possible that might cover the plaintiffs while not covering
everyone who wore corrective lenses. Under the guise of limiting the
statutory coverage to 43 million, the Court went out of its way to
pick an approach that it must have realized would cover far fewer
197. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
199. Another problem with how the Court used the 43 million figure is that it did not seem
to appreciate that individuals could have more than one disability. It observed, for example,
that 100 million Americans wear corrective lenses, 28 million have hearing impairments and
50 million have high blood pressure. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 487
(1999). By implication, the Court suggested that a broad definition of disability could cover
nearly every American if we add those various figures together to arrive at 178 million
Americans. See id. But the Census Bureau arrived at a 37.3 million figure in 1984/85 for the
number of people with limitations even though three of the subcategories (lifting or carrying,
walking, and using stairs) included 18 to 19 million Americans. See CENSUS BUREAU,
DISABILITY, supra note 33, at 2, tbl.A. Many individuals were in all three categories. See id.
200. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
201. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481.
202. Id. at 507 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 49:1
2007] THE MYTHIC 43 MILLION AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 41
than 43 million. Even the most modest application of the civil rights
canon would have precluded that result.2 °3
B. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg
Hallie Kirkingburg had been a commercial truck driver since
1979.204 He had amblyopia. °5 His corrected vision was 20/20 in one
eye but only 20/200 in his other eye.20 6
Albertson's hired Kirkingburg as a truck driver in 1990.207 In
order to be hired, he passed both a physical exam and a 16-mile
road test.20 ' His visual acuity was tested twice-before he was hired
and several months thereafter. 20 9 Even though his visual acuity in
his left eye was 20/200, he was found qualified for the job.2 10 After
Kirkingburg had been on the job for a year, he suffered a non-
driving, work-related injury when he fell from a truck.21' When he
sought to return to work after a long-term absence, Albertson's
required him to be recertified under DOT regulations.212 This time,
the physician determined that Kirkingburg did not meet the DOT's
regular visual acuity standard of at least 20/40 in each eye and
binocular acuity.21 3
When Kirkingburg learned that he had not met DOT's visual
acuity standards, he sought to satisfy their standards through a
waiver program created by the Federal Highway Administration.214
This program was created to bring DOT's standards into compliance
with the ADA without sacrificing highway safety. 215 Under this
program, an individual can obtain a vision waiver if: "he has three
years of recent experience driving a commercial vehicle without (1)
203. See supra Part II.
204. See Kirkingburg v. Albertson's, Inc., 143 F.3d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 1998), reu'd, 527
U.S. 555 (1999).
205. See id. at 1230, 1232.
206. See id. at 1230.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 1230 n.1.
214. See id. at 1231.
215. See id.
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license suspension or revocation, (2) involvement in a reportable
accident in which the applicant received a citation for a moving
violation, and (3) more than two convictions for any other moving
violation in a commercial vehicle." '216 The individual must also
present a report from an optometrist that his vision is correctable
to 20/40 and that he is "able to perform the driving tasks required
to operate a commercial motor vehicle., 217 Kirkingburg met that
standard and received the waiver.21 Albertson's, nonetheless,
terminated Kirkingburg's employment.219 Albertson's explained that
it had a policy of employing only drivers who "meet or exceed the
minimum DOT standards. 22 °
Kirkingburg brought suit against Albertson's, alleging that it
discriminated against him in violation of the ADA.221 Albertson's
moved for summary judgment, arguing that Kirkingburg had not
established a prima facie case under the ADA.222 It argued that he
was not qualified to perform the job of truck driver because he could
not meet the basic DOT vision standards.228 The district court
granted Albertson's motion.224 On appeal, Albertson's made the
additional argument that it was entitled to summary judgment
because Kirkingburg did not have a disability within the meaning
of the ADA.225
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's determination that
Kirkingburg was not disabled as a matter of law.226 Its reasoning,
however, was sloppy in focusing on the fact that "the manner in
which he performed the major life activity of seeing was different"
than for other people.227 Although that observation was correct,
Kirkingburg met the statutory definition of being disabled because
216. Id. (quoting 57 Fed. Reg. 31,450 (1992)).
217. Id. (quoting 57 Fed. Reg. 31,460 (1992)).
218. See id. Because Kirkingburg has monocular vision, he would meet the 20/40 standard
with the vision in his right eye.
219. See id.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 1230.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 1234.
224. See id. at 1230.
225. Id. at 1232.
226. See id. at 1237.
227. Id. at 1232 (emphasis in original) (citing Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627
(8th Cir. 1997)).
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his vision in his left eye, with correction, was only 20/200.228 That
vision placed him in the bottom 2 percent of the population.22 9
The Supreme Court reviewed that aspect of the Ninth Circuit's
decision but offered little clarity on what standards would need to
be met in order for an individual to have a visual disability
under the ADA. 23" The Court chided the Ninth Circuit for discuss-
ing whether Kirkingburg had "differen[t]" vision rather than
"impair[ed]" vision in concluding that he was disabled. 231
After reviewing some of the general evidence about the visual
limitations of individuals with monocular vision, the Court sug-
gested that "our brief examination of some of the medical literature
leaves us sharing the Government's judgment that people with
monocular vision 'ordinarily' will meet the Act's definition of dis-
ability. 23 2 In fact, the vague standards established by the Court
have not led to others with amblyopia (monocular vision) satisfying
the definition of disability under the ADA.2 33 By contrast, if the
Court had adopted a manageable standard, like a "statistical
significance solution" for those with visual impairments, lower
courts (and employers) would have better guidance.234 The focus of
the case would be whether an individual was qualified for employ-
ment, not whether he was an individual with a disability.
228. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
230. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
231. Id. at 564-65.
232. Id. at 567.
233. See infra Part III.D.
234. In fact, the dissenting opinion in Sutton cited a well regarded medical source to
observe that only 2 percent of the population suffers from myopia that is worse than 20/200.
See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 507 n.4 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
majority, by contrast, cited a different source for the proposition that more than 100 million
Americans need corrective lenses to see properly. See id. at 487. The question in the case was
not how many Americans wear corrective lenses; instead, the question was how many
Americans have vision worse than 20/200. The majority and dissenting opinions, nonetheless,
reflect that it is possible to use scientific sources for common impairments to evaluate who is
in the bottom 2 percent of the population.
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C. Murphy v. United Parcel Service
Vaughn Murphy was diagnosed with high blood pressure when he
was ten years old.235 For over twenty years, he performed mechanic
jobs despite the fact that he used a lever to lift heavy objects, did not
run to answer the telephone, did not work above his head, and did
not perform heavy work.236 Murphy applied for a mechanic job at
UPS in August 1994.237 One aspect of this mechanic job was to drive
tractor trailers and package cars to perform "road tests" and "road
calls., 23' He was hired by UPS on August 18, 1994, and performed
road tests on UPS vehicles between twelve and eighteen times. 239 In
order to perform those road tests, a mechanic was supposed to have
a DOT commercial driver's license.240 To obtain such a license, one
must have blood pressure less than or equal to 160/90.241
Although Murphy took medication to reduce his blood pressure,
his treating physician stated that Murphy would never be able to
get his blood pressure below 160/100 without suffering severe side
effects such as stuttering, loss of memory, impotence, lack of sleep,
and irritability. 242 His blood pressure, even when treated, placed
him in the bottom 2 percent of the adult population.243
UPS mistakenly certified Murphy as qualified to obtain a DOT
commercial license despite his high blood pressure. When this
error was detected a month later, however, his employment was
terminated.245 Although Murphy's blood pressure was not low
enough to qualify him for a one-year certification, it was sufficient
235. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 875 (D. Kan. 1996), affd
without opinion, 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998), affd 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 876.
242. See id.
243. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BLOOD PRESSURE LEVELS IN PERSONS 18-
74 YEARS OF AGE IN 1976-80, AND TRENDS IN BLOOD PRESSURE FROM 1960 TO 1980 IN THE
UNITED STATES, at 31 (1986), available at http:lwww.cdc.govlnchsdata/serieslsr..ll/srll-
234.pdf.
244. See Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 876.
245. See id.
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to qualify him for optional temporary DOT health certification.246
Nonetheless, UPS did not allow Murphy to attempt to obtain the
optional temporary certification so that he could retain his employ-
ment.247 The trial court held that Murphy was not disabled because
his high blood pressure did not limit him substantially.248 The court
of appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed.
2 49
The Supreme Court dodged the question of whether Murphy was
"actually disabled" even after taking medication because certiorari
was only granted on the more narrow question of whether his
disability should be assessed in its unmedicated state. 25' Having
ruled in Sutton that one's disability should be assessed after the use
of mitigating measures-an assessment that was not made by the
lower courts in Murphy's case-the Supreme Court did not interject
its own conclusion in this matter. Nonetheless, the framework
offered by the Court to resolve this question is not likely to cover
many individuals who are both disabled and qualified to work. The
Court suggested that the focus of the inquiry, under the Sutton
mitigating measure rule, is "whether petitioner is 'disabled' due to
limitations that persist despite his medication or the negative side
effects of his medication. 25'
A "statistical significance" standard, rather than such a nebulous
standard, would have been more likely to reach the correct result.
That approach would be especially appropriate for individuals like
Murphy-those who were counted in the Census Bureau's disability
determination due to their self-imposed limitations in the perfor-
mance of daily tasks.2 2 Murphy had learned over the years to self-
accommodate by avoiding heavy lifting and activities that would
raise his blood pressure so that he could procure employment as a
mechanic. 3 Murphy would have indicated on the Census Bureau
form that he had difficulty walking one quarter of a mile, difficulty
walking stairs without resting, and difficulty carrying objects as
246. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 522 (1999).
247. See id.
248. See Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 882.
249. See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 518-19.
250. See id. at 521.
251. Id.
252. See Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 872.
253. See id.
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heavy as a full bag of groceries.254 To be moderately (rather than
severely) disabled, the Census Bureau did not require an individual
to be unable to perform those tasks. It merely required that an
individual could only perform them with difficulty.255 Murphy
provided ample evidence of such difficulties, yet not one court that
heard his case ruled in his favor. Those rulings are inconsistent
with the Census Bureau data that formed the basis for Congress's
43 million estimate of individuals with disabilities.
As in Sutton, the focus on whether the plaintiff was disabled
allowed the Court in Murphy to avoid entirely the question of
whether he was qualified for employment.256 Vaughn Murphy is
exactly the kind of person who Congress thought it might assist
through passage of the ADA. He was already employed as a me-
chanic before the ADA went into effect,25 7 but he wanted to improve
his employment situation with a higher paying mechanic job with
UPS. UPS certified him as qualified and had no problems with his
job performance before it began to focus on his blood pressure.25 '
The Court's twisted interpretation of the definition of disability
precluded someone who was clearly terminated because of the
employer's perception that he was too disabled to do the job from
having his day in court to demonstrate that he was qualified for
employment. The ADA is not likely to make an impact on the
employability of individuals with disabilities if such individuals are
outside the scope of statutory coverage.
D. The Statistical Significance Solution
If one accepts the premise that the Court carved out too narrow
a definition of disability in Sutton, then one is left with the difficult
task of constructing an interpretation of the term "disability" that
covers a reasonable, but not unlimited, number of Americans. One
solution is to suggest that the Court merely repeal the "mitigating
254. These tasks specifically were inquired about in the Census survey. See CENSUS
BUREAU, DISABILITY, supra note 33, at 1.
255. See id.
256. See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 522-23.
257. Murphy began working as a mechanic in approximately 1974. See Murphy, 946 F.
Supp. at 875.
258. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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measures" rule. But, as the Court notes, the absence of a mitigating
measures rule could leave the 100 million Americans who wear
corrective lenses covered by the statute if they face discrimination
on that basis.259 If the ADA also covered everyone who takes
medication for high blood pressure and other common conditions,
then it possibly could cover 150 or even 200 million Americans if the
mitigating measure rule is eliminated.
In theory, that result is not problematic. Title VII covers the
entire population because we each have a race or a gender.26 °
Congress, however, did not take the same approach with the ADA
that it took with Title VII. It chose a 'limited class" model, under
which only individuals who were "disabled"-rather than individu-
als who faced discrimination on the basis of a physical characteris-
tic-were covered by the statute.26' Most likely, it made that choice
because it wanted to make "reasonable accommodations" available
to the covered class. 262 The concept of "reasonable accommodations"
does not apply to race or gender claims brought under Title VII. 263
Although studies suggest that reasonable accommodations do not
typically cost more than $500,264 Congress may have been concerned
that reasonable accommodations would prove to be expensive and
thereby may have chosen a "limited class" model to keep down the
costs of accommodation.
In any event, Congress did choose a 'limited class" model for
the ADA irrespective of the virtues of that approach. It created a
definition consistent with a limited class model and drafted a
first finding that suggested that that definition would not cover
much more than one-sixth of the population. The question, then,
is whether there is a manageable way to get rid of the mitigating
259. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
260. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
261. See Kelly Cahill Thomas, Limiting "Limitations" The Scope of the Duty of Reasonable
Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 313, 316 (2005).
262. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006); see also supra Part I.
263. It does apply to religion claims but under a very narrow statutory model. See Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (requiring employers to incur no more
than "de minimis" costs in order to provide accommodation on the basis of religion).
264. See Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior, and the
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 377-78
(1997) (reporting that the average cost of a reasonable accommodation was less than $500,
with many accommodations costing nothing).
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measures rule while also keeping statutory coverage around 43 or
50 million (today's equivalent of one-sixth of the population).
One possible methodology for common, measurable impair-
ments265 such as poor vision or high blood pressure would be to cover
those whose condition places them in the bottom 2.5 percent of the
population irrespective of the effectiveness of mitigating measures.
Instead of the ADA covering all 100 million Americans who wear
corrective lenses, it would only cover the 2 to 3 million Americans
whose vision is two standard deviations below the mean, even if
their vision is correctable with lenses. That figure does not threaten
to cause the ADA to cover nearly the entire population but allows
individuals like the plaintiffs in Sutton or Kirkingburg to receive
statutory protection. One advantage of a statistical significance
approach for common, measurable disabilities is that we would have
a group of individuals who both plaintiffs and defendants would
know with certainty were covered by the statute. Statutory coverage
would also have to be available to others whose impairments are
not readily measurable but who have "substantial limitations" as
required by the statute. A definition of statistical significance,
however, is consistent with the meaning of the word "substantial"
as used in the statute. In fact, the ADA regulations use the term
"significant" to define the term "substantial."'266 Hence, it makes
sense to use a common statistical test to help define the term
"substantial" in the statute.
It should be emphasized, however, that a statistical significance
test is likely to understate the number of individuals with disabili-
ties in our society, because Congress estimated that one-sixth of the
population was covered by the ADA, not merely 2.5 percent. That
test should be a floor rather than a ceiling and should only be
applied to common impairments whose existence can be considered
statistically normal.
Because of the possibility that a statistical significance test would
cause the statute not to cover 43 million, it is important to limit
its application to common, measurable impairments. Further, one
must remember that the "record of' and "regarded as" definitions of
265. This test would not work for psychological impairments that are not readily mea-
surable. Instead, such impairments should be covered without regard to the mitigating
measure rule.
266. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii) (2006).
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disability would still be available to those with common, measurable
impairments who did not meet the two standard deviation require-
ment. If these individuals are treated as if their impairment is
severe when it is mild, they still might be "regarded as" disabled.267
One major challenge in fashioning a legal definition of disability
is, as stated at the outset, that the term "disability" is an arbitrary
term that seeks to fit a wide range of people.268 People with mental
impairments have little in common with people with visual im-
pairments, hearing impairments, or mobility impairments. Hence,
it was a mistake for the Court to try to develop an overarching
definition that would readily apply to all types of disabilities. A
more cautious approach would allow the Court to see what types
of definitions work in a variety of different contexts. But, unfortu-
nately, the definition chosen by the Court in Sutton does not even
work well in the context of visual impairments, even though the
case involved plaintiffs with visual impairments.269
If the Court had not crafted such a broad holding in Sutton, which
applied to a range of disabilities not yet before the Court, its
decision could have promoted dialogue on an appropriate legal
standard that would approximate the Census Bureau data. Instead,
the Sutton opinion has inappropriately closed the door until the
Court confesses its error and reexamines the issue.27 ° The Court's
current analysis of disability under the "actually disabled"27' prong
leaves far fewer than 13.5 million Americans protected by the ADA,
and individuals like the Sutton twins, Vaughn Murphy, and Hallie
Kirkingburg outside the scope of statutory protection. For the ADA
to provide effective protection in the workplace, it needs to protect
such individuals whose disability is relatively mild, yet who fall
within the bottom 2.5 percent of the population. The Court needs to
devise a framework that is more consistent with Congress's stated
intentions to protect at least 43 million Americans, so that such
individuals are swept under the disability umbrella.
267. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
268. See supra Part I.
269. See supra Part III.A.
270. See supra Part III.A.
271. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006).
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IV. REGARDED AS DISABLED
If the Supreme Court's interpretation of the "actually disabled"
prong is correct, then other tools must be available to broaden the
scope of statutory coverage beyond the 13.5 million severely dis-
abled individuals covered under that prong. One option would be for
the "regarded as" prong (subsection (C))272 to be such a vehicle.27
Under subsection (C), the ADA could cover individuals with no
impairments or mild impairments who do not meet the "actually
disabled" definition of disability but who face discrimination due to
the stereotypes of others. Because those individuals rarely, if ever,
are eligible for reasonable accommodations, a liberal interpretation
of subsection (C) could help protect many Americans who cannot
meet the standards imposed under the "actually disabled" prong
without imposing costs on defendants through accommodations.
Nonetheless, the Sutton decision also made subsection (C) unavail-
able for such plaintiffs.
In considering this option, it is important to remember that the
43 million figure does not even apply to cases brought under the
"record of' or "regarded as" prongs. The 43 million figure was an
estimate of people who were actually disabled. 4 The other two
prongs should broaden statutory coverage beyond that figure.
272. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2006).
273. Subsection (B)'s "record of" rule could be another vehicle, because the courts have
interpreted the "record of' definition narrowly. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2006). One unduly
restrictive requirement that many courts have imposed on subsection (B) "record of' cases is
the requirement that the employer actually have viewed medical documentation that
misclassified the plaintiff as disabled; word of mouth knowledge of such misclassification is
insufficient to establish a "record of' disability. See, e.g., Taylor v. Nimock's Oil Co., 214 F.3d
957, 961 (8th Cir. 2000) ("In order to have a record of a disability, an employee's 'documen-
tation must show' that she has a history of or has been subject to misclassification as
disabled."); Sorensen v. Univ. of Utah Hosp., 194 F.3d 1084, 1087 (10th Cir. 1999); Hilburn
v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that plaintiff
furnished no evidence that employer had any record of a substantially limiting impairment).
For example, the Taylor court concluded that the employer's "mere knowledge of [plaintiffs]
heart attack, coupled with the sending of a get-well card and a note about her job duties, [does
not] constituteD sufficient documentation that [plaintiff] had a history of disability or that
[the employer] misclassified her as disabled within the meaning of the ADA." Taylor, 214 F.3d
at 961. Privacy rules make it extremely unlikely that employers would have viewed the
medical records themselves; such a narrow interpretation of the "record of' rule makes it an
ineffective way for plaintiffs to establish that they are disabled. The Supreme Court has not
yet considered this line of cases but, as cited above, it has been adopted in several circuits.
274. See supra Part I.
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Subsection (C) is, by its own terms, particularly encompassing. It
does not require an individual to have an impairment at all, and
certainly does not require an individual to be disabled by the
impairment. Subsection (C), as will be discussed below, covers
anyone who is treated in a mistaken or stereotypical way even
though she is not actually disabled as defined by the "actually
disabled" prong. Subsection (C) potentially covers any individual,
because any of us could be treated stereotypically based on an
impairment we do not possess. The Court, however, has gone to
great lengths to limit subsection (C) so that it covers virtually no
one. That restriction cannot be justified by the 43 million figure
which, by its own terms, only applies to those who are actually
disabled. Again, even the most modest application of the civil rights
canon would reach a contrary result.
A. Sutton & Murphy
The "regarded as" definition of disability seeks to protect
individuals in three different categories:
(1) The individual may have an impairment which is
not substantially limiting but is perceived by the
employer or other covered entity as constituting a
substantially limiting impairment;
(2) The individual may have an impairment which is only
substantially limiting because of the attitudes of
others toward the impairment; or
(3) The individual may have no impairment at all but is
regarded by the employer or other covered entity as
having a substantially limiting impairment.2 75
The Sutton plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to bring a
claim under subsection (C) under the first of these three theories
because the employer exaggerated the scope of the limitations
imposed by their visual impairments. 276 They contended that United
Airlines "mistakenly believes their physical impairments substan-
275. 29 C.F.R.§ 1630.2() (2006).
276. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490 (1999).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tially limit them in the major life activity of working." '277 They
alleged that United Airlines "has a vision requirement that is
allegedly based on myth and stereotype. 278
At first glance, the Sutton case should have easily fallen within
the "regarded as" definition of disability under the first theory.
There was no dispute in the case that the plaintiffs were rejected for
employment because of a physical attribute. Although the Court, in
its earlier discussion of subsection (A)-the "actually disabled"
prong-concluded that their vision was not a "disabling condition"
as defined by the ADA, the employer appeared to regard it as a
disabling condition in denying them employment.279 One only
proceeds to subsection (C), under the first theory, if one has a
condition that has been determined not to meet the definition of
disability under subsection (A). Hence, the argument under
subsection (C) will be that an employer treated a condition as
disabling when, in fact, it was not.
The complication in Sutton arose from the "class of jobs" rule that
the EEOC crafted for cases brought under subsection (A). The
Supreme Court erroneously applied this rule, which is not required
by the statutory language, to the subsection (C) context.2"'
In the regulations defining "substantially limits," the EEOC
states that with respect to the major life activity of working that:
The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in
the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform
a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limita-
tion in the major life activity of working.2"'
Hence, a plaintiff who contends that he or she has a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits the major life activity
of "working" has to establish that he or she is limited in the
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 489-90.
280. Id. at 489-93.
281. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2006) (emphasis added).
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performance of a class of jobs, not merely the specific job in ques-
tion.
According to Professor Chai Feldblum, 2 2 the EEOC drafted this
regulation in response to concerns raised by Christopher Bell, an
attorney working for the EEOC, which were embraced by the House
Judiciary Committee during its consideration of the ADA.2"3 The
House Judiciary Committee noted in its report that a person should
not be able to use subsection (A) if he or she is limited "in his or her
ability to perform only a particular job, because of circumstances
unique to that job site or the materials used."2 4 But the House
Judiciary Committee made clear in its report that the confined
nature of the "substantially limits" rule in the context of the major
life activity of working only applied to subsection (A). It did not
apply to subsection (C):
[A] person who is rejected from a job because of the myths, fears
and stereotypes associated with disabilities would be covered
under this third test, whether or not the employer's perception
was shared by others in the field and whether or not the person's
physical or mental condition would be considered a disability
under the first or second part of the definition.2"
Whether the EEOC regulation, as applied to subsection (A), is
ultra vires goes beyond the scope of this Article.286 But it makes no
sense to apply this regulation to a subsection (C) case. Presumably,
the "class of jobs" regulation was drafted to help limit an employer's
282. Feldblum, supra note 9, at 133.
283. Id.
284. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,451.
285. Id. at 30, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 453. The EEOC interpretive guidance makes a similar
statement. The interpretive guidance states: "[T]herefore, if an individual can show that an
employer or other covered entity made an employment decision because of a perception of
disability based on 'myth, fear or stereotype,' the individual will satisfy the 'regarded as' part
of the definition of disability." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (2006).
286. One might argue that the EEOC should promulgate regulations consistent with the
statutory language, not one sentence found in a committee report. Ironically, the Supreme
Court in Sutton accepts this regulation for the purpose of narrowing the scope of the ADA,
while it rejects the EEOC's mitigating measure rule (which was also contained in each of the
three major Senate and House committee reports). Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471, 489-90 (1999). Selective deference to the EEOC and the legislative history is difficult to
justify, especially when this deference is only employed to narrow rather than broaden
interpretation of the statute in conflict with the civil rights canon.
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reasonable accommodation expenses.287 In a subsection (A) case, an
individual who alleges that she is disabled because she is substan-
tially limited in the major life activity of working would necessarily
request accommodations that would allow her to be a qualified
worker. By requiring that the plaintiff demonstrate that her
physical or mental impairment substantially limits her in a broad
class of jobs, the EEOC limits the number of individuals who can
qualify as disabled under that definition of disability. In turn, the
rule would then limit the number of cases in which defendants
would be asked to spend money on reasonable accommodations.
Those concerns, however, are not applicable to a subsection (C)
case. In the subsection (C) case which proceeds under theory one,
the plaintiff takes the position that she is qualified for employment
but has been stereotypically denied employment because the
employer has exaggerated the consequences of her physical or
mental impairment. She is typically not requesting accommoda-
tions; she is merely requesting an opportunity to demonstrate that
her impairment does not preclude her from being qualified.
Applying the class of jobs rule to a subsection (C) case would
impose an unrealistic burden of proof on the plaintiff. The only
evidence she has available is that the defendant considered her
unable to perform the particular job for which she applied because
of an exaggerated understanding of her physical or mental impair-
ment. She would have no basis to demonstrate that the defendant
considered her unqualified for a broad class of jobs, because the
defendant need not have an opinion with respect to a broad class of
jobs. In the Sutton case, for example, the plaintiffs would have no
way to know or establish that the defendant considered them unable
to fly any airplanes, drive any vehicles, or participate in various
other occupations. They only knew that the defendant viewed them
as unqualified to perform the discrete job of global airline pilot for
which they applied.
The Sutton Court, however, did not pause to consider whether the
"class of jobs" rules should apply to cases brought under both
subsections (C) and (A). It held that the plaintiffs could not establish
that they were being substantially limited in the major life activity
of working because they could merely allege that the defendant
287. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2006).
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regarded them as unqualified to work in the position of global
airline pilot.2"8 But, of course, United had no reason to have or
express an opinion about their qualifications for a position other
than the one for which they applied.
Similarly, Vaughn Murphy lost in the Supreme Court under his
subsection (C) theory because he could only demonstrate that the
employer perceived him to be unable to perform the particular
job as a mechanic at UPS due to his high blood pressure.28 9 It is, of
course, possible that the employer also thought his high blood
pressure made him unable to walk, drive safely, engage in recre-
ational activities, do simple housework, garden, or play with
children. But Vaughn Murphy would have no way of knowing those
facts. All he knew was that the employer believed his high blood
pressure rendered him unqualified to work as a mechanic for UPS
even though he could obtain the proper medical clearance from DOT
to test drive UPS's trucks.29
In light of the limited evidence available about the employer's
perceptions, the Court found that "[a]t most, petitioner has shown
that he is regarded as unable to perform the job of mechanic only
when that job requires driving a commercial motor vehicle-a
specific type of vehicle used on a highway in interstate commerce. 29'
Thus, "in light of petitioner's skills and the array of jobs available
to petitioner utilizing those skills, petitioner has failed to show that
he is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs., 292 The Court
used the "class of jobs" regulation to avoid asking the question
whether UPS exaggerated the scope of Murphy's impairment to
deny him employment opportunities.293
288. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493-94.
289. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 520 (1999).
290. Id. at 522. Kirkingburg also argued that he should prevail under subsection (C).
Kirkingburg v. Albertson's, Inc., 143 F.3d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1998). Like the plaintiffs in
Sutton, he lost under the "class of jobs" rule. The court noted that one of Kirkingburg's
managers described him as "blind in one eye or legally blind." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
The "regarded as" theory was not part of the certiorari petition, so the Supreme Court did not
rule on that issue in Kirkingburg. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 563 n.9
(1999).
291. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 524.
292. Id. at 525.
293. UPS, for example, insisted that DOT certification was necessary for Murphy to
perform the essential functions of his job. Id. at 524. But DOT certification was only required
if the vehicle was to be used on a highway in interstate commerce. 49 C.F.R. § 390.5 (1998).
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The "class of jobs" rule, as this Article will demonstrate below,
has been devastating to plaintiffs in subsection (C) cases because
employment discrimination plaintiffs who bring cases under sub-
section (C) will nearly always allege that they meet the definition of
disability due to the major life activity of working. By definition,
subsection (C) plaintiffs take the position that they are not disabled
but are being treated by others as if they are disabled. In the
employment context, that evidence of adverse treatment is most
likely going to involve an employer's misperception of their ability
to perform a particular job. It is possible that the employer also has
misperceptions about their inability to perform other major life
activities (or other jobs), but plaintiffs have no way of producing
such evidence.
B. Post-Sutton Case Law
The case law reflects that subsection (C) has been useless in ADA
employment cases and that it has little application outside the
employment context. The EEOC's "major life activity of working"
guidance, coupled with the Sutton Court's narrow interpretation of
that guidance, has been fatal to plaintiffs' subsection (C) claims in
the employment context.
Before the Supreme Court decided Sutton, courts were mixed
with respect to how strictly they applied the "working" rule in
"regarded as" cases.294 After Sutton, virtually no set of facts seems
sufficient to establish a "regarded as" claim of meeting the defini-
Driving a truck around a parking lot or local road does not implicate this requirement.
Because the case was decided on summary judgment, there are no facts in the record about
the necessity of Murphy having the DOT certification.
294. The EEOC successfully brought a pre-Sutton 'regarded as' substantially limited in
the major life activity of working" case on behalf of Arazella Manual who was denied
employment as a bus driver on the basis of the medical examiner's conclusion that she was
too obese to move swiftly enough to deal with an emergency while performing the duties of
bus driver. See EEOC v. Tex. Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965, 980 (S.D. Tex. 1996). The lower
court never mentioned the "class of jobs" rule in this case, even though there was only
evidence in the record about plaintiffs perceived inability to perform one bus driving job. Id.
By contrast, Don Fredregill lost his "regarded as" case because his argument that he was
denied promotion to a senior management position due to a perception that he was too obese
to be qualified for such employment did not meet the "class of jobs" rule. See Fredregill v.
Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1082, 1090-92 (S.D. Iowa 1997).
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tion of disability in the employment context.295 Of the fifty or so
appellate cases that have proceeded under the "regarded as" theory
since the Court decided Sutton, only a few have been successful.296
Ronald Foore's case typifies this pattern. He had uncorrectable
vision of 20/400, was discharged from his position as a police officer,
and was unable to meet the definition of disability under the
"actually disabled" or "regarded as" definitions.297 While acknowl-
edging the Albertson's Court's holding that individuals with
monocular vision will "ordinarily" meet the "actually disabled" test,
the Fourth Circuit found that Foore's self-compensation for his
monocular vision made him not the "ordinary case. ' He also could
295. See, e.g., Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding
that plaintiff who requested lifting restriction did not establish that he was regarded as
disabled when discharged by employer); Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919 (7th Cir.
2001) (refusing to speculate that employer regarded plaintiff as disabled when it terminated
him after learning of his hepatitis); Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492 (10th Cir. 2000)
(finding plaintiff who suffered stress-related illnesses and was terminated from her
administrative position not to be regarded as disabled); Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d
507 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that police officer did not meet "regarded as" definition of
disability when he argued that police department overreacted after learning that he was
taking medication as treatment for depression). But see McInnis v. Alamo Cmty Coll. Dist.,
207 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2000) (reversing defendant's summary judgment against plaintiffwhere
evidence indicated that defendant's compliance coordinator had stated that she could tell that
plaintiff was perceived as disabled; evidence also indicated that defendant acted on the
perception of his disability by transferring plaintiff. This case, however, involved the major
life activity of speech rather than working.).
296. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999); Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2001). In light of Sutton, it is surprising that any
lawyers would even try to bring an appellate case on a "regarded as" theory where the major
life activity is "working," given the stringent test developed by the Court for those cases.
Nonetheless, I have found that lawyers continue to bring those cases. And, as discussed in the
following paragraphs of this Article, many of those cases are unsuccessful. The fact that
lawyers have been willing to bring those cases, however, has caused the Sixth Circuit, as I
will discuss, to try to relax the legal rules to make it possible for some of those cases to be
successful. The courts, of course, can only adjust the legal rules as a result of continued
litigation.
297. Foore v. City of Richmond, 6 F. App'x 148, 150 (4th Cir. 2001).
298. Id. at 153. A Ninth Circuit decision also confirms that individuals with monocular
vision have difficulty demonstrating that they are disabled or regarded as disabled. See EEOC
v. United Parcel Serv., 306 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing district court ruling in
favor of plaintiff with monocular vision in a case involving parcel delivery service). In another
relevant case, the plaintiff succeeded in meeting the definition of disability in a "regarded as"
case as a result of his monocular vision, but he was found not to be qualified for employment
based on his vision. See Dyke v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 327 F.3d 628, 633-34 (7th Cir. 2003).
Hence, Dyke's case is consistent with the observation that it is virtually impossible both to
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not meet the "regarded as" definition because "police officer" was not
considered to be a broad enough class of jobs.299 Foore was fired from
his position merely because he could not meet a vision require-
ment--even though the court found he had no significant vision
problems, and even though his job performance as a police officer
had been entirely satisfactory. 0 The evidence could only demon-
strate that the police department found him unqualified to perform
the job he had held; that evidence was insufficient to meet the "class
of jobs" rule."1 Without the "class of jobs" rule, he had the perfect
case of being treated unfairly due to a false assumption about his
physical abilities. A jury had awarded him $50,000; the judge
reduced the award to $5000 but awarded him attorney's fees.3"2 The
Fourth Circuit overturned that decision," 3 holding that the "class of
jobs" technicality precluded a jury from awarding him damages for
what it considered to be unlawful disability discrimination."4
The "class of jobs" problems have precluded many other plaintiffs
from obtaining relief."5 In the First Circuit, Steven Lessard's work
as a "mounting employee" could not meet the "class of jobs" rule,
and there were not sufficient job openings for him to demonstrate a
perception of not being qualified for all jobs requiring repetitive
work.3" 6 In the Second Circuit, Cristina Peters lost her claim at trial
because the position she sought as a school guidance counselor was
be "disabled" and "qualified" for employment.
299. Foore, 6 F. App'x at 154.
300. Id. at 150.
301. Id. at 153.
302. Id. at 151.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 154.
305. See, e.g., Carruthers v. BSA Adver., Inc., 357 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2004) (affirming
district court granting employer's motion for judgment as a matter of law in a case in which
plaintiff alleged that employer regarded her bilateral hand strain/sprain as precluding her
from working); Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2001)
(affirming decision that the employer did not regard plaintiff as disabled in a case involving
a reporter with keyboard and handwriting limitations; court found insufficient evidence to
meet the "class of jobs" test in the "actually regarded" phase of the lawsuit); Haulbrook v.
Michelin N. Am., 252 F.3d 696 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that discharged employee could not
meet definition of disability under "regarded as" theory where employer simply believed he
could not work at one of its facilities due to chemical sensitivities).
306. Lessard v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 175 F.3d 193, 197-98 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that
plaintiff who had suffered shrapnel wounds in his left hand was not able to demonstrate that
he was regarded as unable to do all jobs involving repetitive work because a broad category
of jobs were not available to the plaintiff when he unsuccessfully applied for work).
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found not to meet the "class of jobs" rule.30 7 The court of appeals
overturned that decision on another ground.0 8 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed a trial court decision that an employee, Tess Rohan, who
allegedly suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and severe
depression, was not "regarded as" disabled by her employer merely
because it perceived that she could not work as an actress in a
touring theater company.0 9 In the Fifth Circuit, an emergency room
doctor who allegedly received adverse treatment after being exposed
to hepatitis C could not meet the "class of jobs" rule.3 1° Similarly, the
Sixth Circuit held that John Swanson did not sufficiently allege that
he was "regarded as" disabled in a class of jobs due to his depression
because the employer "perceived Swanson as a capable physician,
just not a capable surgeon under [the hospital's] program."31' The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Robert Tockes's suit
against Air-Land Transportation Services for not meeting the
"regarded as" definition of disability, even though the evidence
indicated that he was told he was being fired because "he was
crippled, and the company was at fault for having hired a handi-
capped person." '312 The Eighth Circuit rejected a case brought by
Albert James Conant, who sought a general laborer position with
the city of Hibbing, because he had no evidence to demonstrate how
the employer would have treated him with regard to other laborer
positions within the city. 313 A plaintiff did succeed on the "regarded
as" theory in the Tenth Circuit, but only because she was able to
demonstrate that the employer refused to consider her for a wide
307. Peters v. Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 2003)
(summarizing the trial court decision).
308. Id. ("A mental illness that impels one to suicide can be viewed as a paradigmatic
instance of inability to care for onself.").
309. Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 277-78 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding
that touring theater company actress was not a broad class of jobs). The court relied on a prior
Fourth Circuit case in which a subsection (A) plaintiff could not meet the "class of jobs" rule
in a case involving a utility repair worker. Id. at 278 (citing Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931
(4th Cir. 1986)).
310. Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2003). The hospital
administrator allegedly said "that he didn't think that [plaintiff] could work in the Emergency
Room with hepatitis C, that he wouldn't go to a dentist with hepatitis C and he would not let
[plaintiff] suture his child." Id. at 506 (internal quotation omitted). That remark was
insufficient to sustain the "regarded as" theory.
311. Swanson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 268 F.3d 307,318 (6th Cir. 2001).
312. See Tockes v. Air-Land Transp. Servs., Inc., 343 F.3d 895, 896 (7th Cir. 2003).
313. Conant v. City of Hibbing, 271 F.3d 782, 785-86 (8th Cir. 2001).
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range of jobs in the sheriffs department, despite her ten years of
service, when she attempted to return to work after having sought
treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder.314 It is not clear that
McKenzie would have prevailed if the defendant had merely found
her unqualified to work as a patrol officer given the adverse
decisions on that fact pattern from other circuits.
Hence, the courts have found that plaintiffs have not met the
"class of jobs" test in "regarded as" cases when they were perceived
as unable to be emergency room doctors, surgeons, laborers, senior
management, bus drivers, police officers, school counselors, and
actresses in a touring company. Even evidence that plaintiffs were
subjected to derogatory terms like "cripple" did not lead courts to
speculate that defendants generally regarded them as disabled."'
Plaintiffs can only prevail in the exceptional case in which the
defendant foolishly offers a view on a wide range of jobs that happen
to be available for employment. The Sixth Circuit has recognized
recently that the existing rules make a "regarded as" case in the
context of working "extraordinarily difficult."31 6 The court observed
that:
It is safe to assume [that when] employers do not regularly
consider the panoply of other jobs their employees could perform,
and certainly do not often create direct evidence of such consid-
erations, the plaintiffs task becomes even more difficult. Yet the
drafters of the ADA and its subsequent interpretive regulations
clearly intended that plaintiffs who are mistakenly regarded as
being unable to work have a cause of action under the statute.317
Recognizing the difficulty posed by such cases in a case involving
a salesperson who developed a bad back, the Sixth Circuit found
that evidence of pretext could help establish the required level of
proof.31 In a subsequent decision, the same court found in favor of
314. McKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967, 968 (10th Cir. 2001).
315. Tockes, 343 F.3d at 896.
316. Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 2001).
317. Id.
318. Id. ("In cases such as this one, where there is substantial evidence that an individual's
medical status played a significant role in an employer's decision to fire that individual,
combined with evidence that the employer concocted a pretextual justification for that firing
.... The resolution of that issue is properly left to the jury.").
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an administrator who was discharged because of an alleged
misperception that he was an alcoholic.319 There was no direct
evidence that the employer viewed the plaintiff as being unable to
perform any particular job except the one he held. The Sixth Circuit,
however, was willing to speculate to meet the "class of jobs" rule
that there was a "reasonable inference" that the plaintiff s purported
alcoholism "rendered him incapable of performing a substantial
number of managerial jobs." 2 ° Despite noting the "extraordinary"
difficulty of the class of jobs rule, the Sixth Circuit has not ques-
tioned whether the statute should even be interpreted to require
that rule in the "regarded as" context.
C. Further Retrenchment: Toyota Decision
It is time for the courts to reject the "class of jobs" rule, especially
in the "regarded as" context, and return the ADA to the protection
of at least 43 million Americans. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
does not appear to be going in that direction. If anything, its recent
decisions suggest that it is further constricting the scope of the
ADA so that it can only protect the 13.5 or so million people that
the Census Bureau defines as being "severely disabled." This fact
became most evident in the Court's 2002 decision in Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams. 1 In this case involving
a woman who the Sixth Circuit had found was "actually disabled"
under subsection (A),322 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded
with instructions that the lower court should determine whether the
plaintiffs physical impairment "prevents or severely restricts the
individual from doing activities that are of central importance to
most people's daily lives.3 23 Neither the statute nor regulations,
however, contain a "severely restricts" requirement. The statute
refers to a "substantial limitation," which the regulations define
as including a "significant" restriction. 324 The Court offered no
319. Moorer v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Sys., 398 F.3d 469, 483-85 (6th Cir. 2005).
320. Id. at 484.
321. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
322. Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 224 F.3d 840, 842-43 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd,
534 U.S. 184 (2002).
323. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added).
324. The regulations state that "substantially limits" means "significantly restricted as to
the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major
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explanation for why it raised the requirement from "significant" to
"severe."
The Court's statement in Toyota that a plaintiff seeking to prove
that she is disabled under subsection (A) must demonstrate that she
is "severely" limited is consistent with this Article's thesis that the
Court has used the Census Bureau's "severe limitation" defini-
tion-which, according to the Census Bureau, covers no more than
13.5 million Americans, most of whom are too disabled to work. The
ADA, however, does not impose a "severe limitation" requirement
under the definition of disability, and the law purportedly protects
far more than the 13.5 million Americans whom the Census Bureau
considers to be severely disabled. There are numerous devices that
the Court has used to limit coverage of the ADA to a group far fewer
than 43 million Americans. The "regarded as" theory, coupled with
the "major life activity of working' rule, is a crucial part of that
problem and precludes the statute from being an effective remedy
to the problem of employment discrimination.
CONCLUSION
The ADA was historic legislation that sought to embody an anti-
subordination perspective to provide protection for a class of
individuals in society. Congress stated in its findings and purpose
sections that it sought to protect a discrete and insular minority,
and that it considered the size of that group to be at least 43 million
Americans. Further, Congress stated that it wanted this statute to
provide meaningful protection in the area of employment discrimi-
nation. The Supreme Court has undermined this basic intention by
construing the protected class so narrowly that it has virtually
become a nullity in the employment context.
The problems that individuals with disabilities face in the
employment sector are twofold. Some individuals with disabilities
could engage in employment if they received accommodations.
Often, they just need to use the ADA as a vehicle to gain such
accommodations. Other individuals have milder physical or mental
impairments and could engage in employment if they were given a
life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average
person in the general population can perform that same major life activity." 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(j)(ii) (2006).
[Vol. 49:1
2007] THE MYTHIC 43 MILLION AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 63
chance to demonstrate their capabilities rather than their disabili-
ties. They do not seek accommodations; they seek an opportunity to
overcome myths and stereotypes about their disabilities. The first
group needs to come within the statute's "actually disabled" prong
to obtain effective assistance in maintaining employment. The
second group could come within the "actually disabled" or "regarded
as" prongs to attain assistance, as they have only become disabled
through the attitudes of others. It is essential that the ADA provide
protection to this second group of individuals, like the Sutton twins,
Hallie Kirkingburg, and Vaughn Murphy, if it is to have a meaning-
ful impact on the employment opportunities of individuals with
disabilities. It is critical that the courts keep that larger objective in
mind when interpreting the scope of the definition of disability
under the ADA.
One response to this story of overly narrow protection is to
suggest that Congress enact corrective legislation to restore its
original intentions. Given the Court's hostility to the ADA's anti-
subordination perspective, however, no good option is available to
Congress. Congress could seek to overturn the Sutton mitigating
measure rule, but a sweeping reversal of Sutton, without something
like the statistical significance rule proposed by this Article, would
leave nearly every American covered by the ADA and able to
request reasonable accommodations. Even if the business commu-
nity tolerated such an amendment, we can anticipate that the courts
would seek to find other narrowing devices to limit such a broad
statutory scope, such as narrowly interpreting the reasonable
accommodation requirement.
Another alternative is for Congress to abandon the anti-subordi-
nation approach and make statutory protection available to anyone
who faces discrimination on the basis of a physical or mental
condition. Like the first alternative, this alternative would provide
a potential cause of action to nearly every individual in society. By
abandoning the protected class approach, however, Congress might
create the potential for "reverse discrimination" lawsuits.
The drawbacks of both approaches reflect what a masterful job
Congress did in 1990 by defining a protected class that was also
entitled to reasonable accommodation. That approach posed chal-
lenges when plaintiffs had a common impairment, like poor vision,
because it was not clear whether Congress intended such individu-
als to come within the scope of statutory coverage. But the Court did
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not have to undermine the effectiveness of the statute's ability to
address employment discrimination problems in order to respond to
this challenging fact pattern. It should have adopted something like
the 2 percent rule proposed by this Article for such cases, and
otherwise left intact Congress's skillful work. There should be no
need to amend the 1990 statute. Instead, the Court should honor
Congress's basic purpose to provide a "clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities." '325
Congress should not have to amend the ADA to restore its
original intentions. One enactment should be enough. The courts
should use the civil rights canon to construe the ADA as intended
by Congress. Members of Congress have come to realize that the
courts' failure to apply the civil rights canon is part of the nature of
this interpretation problem. The recently introduced "Americans
with Disabilities Act Restoration Act of 2006" ends with a provision
entitled "Rule of Construction" in which the bill instructs the courts
to construe the ADA broadly to achieve its remedial purpose.2 6
But Congress should not find itself in a position in which it needs
to lecture the courts on how to do their jobs. The application of the
civil rights canon should be an inherent part of the judicial process,
especially for a Supreme Court that has grown increasingly fond of
substantive canons. Broad construction of civil rights is as old as the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause; it is time for
that rule of construction, once again, to become a mainstay of the
interpretation of civil rights laws. At a minimum, interpretation of
the scope of the coverage of the ADA deserves to benefit from
application of that canon, as have other civil rights statutes in their
early years of interpretation, to further an anti-subordination
perspective. Congress can then spend its time crafting new legisla-
tion rather than continually resuscitating prior legislation. Only
then can there be a respectful relationship between Congress and
the judiciary so that future articles do not have to recount how the
Supreme Court has, once again, "dissed" Congress. 27
325. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006).
326. H.R. 6258, 109th Cong. § 6 (2d Sess. 2006).
327. In another context, I have argued that the Court's disregard of Congress's handiwork
can only be described as the Court "dissing" Congress. See Colker & Brudney, supra note 3.
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